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- Why does Lukashenka hate BNR?

Its founders did not cooperate with the Nazis (they didn't exist then), the vast majority of them, like Lukashenka, had leftist views. It was in 1918 that the independence of the country ruled by Lukashenka was declared for the first time in recent history.

In 2018, when, with gnashing of teeth, the society was allowed to celebrate 100 years of BNR, this enmity was probably the least, but it was there even then.

And why?

Pashkevich:

The reasons for this attitude are on the surface.

Lukashenko is a Soviet man in his worldview.

During the Soviet era, the history of the BNR was kept silent.

They began to talk about it widely during the years of Gorbachev's perestroika (then Lukashenka also learned about it).

At that time, this topic was promoted and raised on a pedestal by national forces.

Aleksandar Pashkevich, archival photo

And since Lukashenka saw national forces as his opponents almost from the beginning of his political career and from the beginning of his tenure as the head of the state, that is why he fought with them - not only on the political, but also on the ideological field.

The ideas of the BNR could not take place in Lukashenko's ideology also because this ideology was oriented towards Russia from the beginning.

And the idea of ​​independence from Russia contradicted this.

— Alexander gave an explanation: Lukashenko is Soviet.

But in March 2018, during the celebration of the 100th Independence Day of the BNR, some expressed the opinion that the state would hold its own holiday in January 2019, on the 100th anniversary of the formation of the BSSR, Soviet Belarus.

The hundredth anniversary of the BSSR was marked extremely modestly and sluggishly.

Why?

Valer Karbalevich

Karbalevich:

Belarus solemnly celebrated 100 years of the Soviet militia, Lukashenka came to the solemn meeting.

The jubilee of the Soviet army was magnificently celebrated.

And it was not possible to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the BSSR, because just then there were fierce conflicts with the Kremlin regarding integration.

There was no loud commemoration of the centenary of the USSR.

In the 1990s, Belarusian society was dominated by nostalgia for Soviet times.

A significant part of society perceived the Soviet era with a plus sign.

In Belarus, during the Soviet era, the industrial revolution took place, which improved the life of the majority of the population, and rapid urbanization took place in those times.

And when Gorbachev criticized the period of "stagnation", he was poorly understood in Belarus.

Masherov times were very good for many.

This is exactly what Lukashenka played on when he proposed the idea of ​​integration with Russia as a means of resuscitating the USSR.

In this vein, there was the return of the renewed flag and coat of arms of the BSSR, and the return of the holiday of the October Revolution.

It was an attempt to get into the focus of the expectations of the electorate.

But during Lukashenka's rule, the generation changed.

For the new generation, the Soviet era is distant history.

2020 showed that there is no nostalgia for the Soviet era.

Lukashenko understands this, and that is why he singled out the Great Patriotic War from the entire Soviet period, and it is on it that he bases his old-new ideological concept.

- Maybe I would clarify: not so much war, but victory.

Isn't this another explanation why he hates the BNR.

For him, that republic is a sign of trouble, another Belarusian failure.

They tried to create it, and a few months later the Red Army came and destroyed that republic.

Perhaps Lukashenka does not want to carry a historical pedigree from defeat.

So, the VKL existed for several centuries, chasing Moscow from time to time.

They won, in a word.

They also won in May 1945.

Pashkevich:

I don't think that Lukashenka reflected and considered so deeply where there was victory and where there was defeat, and from what to trace the pedigree.

He is a more pragmatic politician.

He always felt threatened by national symbols.

And BNR was perceived precisely as one of such symbols.

He hated his opponents, and accordingly hated their symbols.

You rightly noticed that many members of the BNR were leftists and did not differ so much in their views from the Bolsheviks.

But these nuances do not matter much when history becomes part of a fierce ideological confrontation.

In fact, the leaders of the BNR were not such staunch enemies of Russia.

But there is a myth of the BNR, which was supported for decades, which was perceived as something absolutely hostile to the Lukashenka regime.

In 2018, Lukashenko, under the influence of some of his entourage, tried to somehow play with this symbol.

But he soon gave up on it.

Karbalevich:

Well, the Soviet era also ended in defeat.

Also, it would not be worth carrying out your genealogy, if we accept your explanation, Yuri.

From Lukashenka's point of view, the permission to celebrate in 2018 was a mistake.

And this became obvious in 2020, when the protest took place under the white-red-white flag.

And I think that now there will be no game with the BNR project until the end of his administration.

— It is interesting to compare the Belarusian situation with the experience of other post-Soviet countries.

Since the beginning of the 90s, Ukraine and Georgia have respected their republics, which were proclaimed in the tenth years of the 20th century, because their anti-Russian, democratic, pro-European pathos corresponded to the policy of these countries after the collapse of the USSR.

But among the countries that were formed after the collapse of the USSR, there were those that, until recently, were much more repressive and authoritarian than Lukashenka's Belarus.

In the sense of human rights, let's say Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan is hell.

But even these countries recognize their lineage from attempts to gain independence at the beginning of the 20th century.

Today's Azerbaijan, which was recently led by a former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU Heydar Aliyev, celebrates the independence declared by the anti-communist Mussavatists.

In the countries of Central Asia, the so-called basmachs were rehabilitated.

But it is not like that in Belarus.

And all the last 30 years are not like that.

In 1994, Lukashenka was yesterday's director of the state farm and partargo.

But now he is not yesterday's party committee secretary.

Karbalevich:

Maybe because Belarus was or wasn't the most Soviet republic.

Soviet ideology permeated both society and the elite as deeply as, perhaps, nowhere else.

Lukashenka followed the Belarusian society.

And it perceived the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet system rather with a minus sign.

Pashkevich:

Lukashenka repeatedly mentions the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a source of Belarusian statehood.

In recent years, interest in the Principality of Polotsk has increased at the state level.

So he tries to integrate ancient history into his political and historical narrative (perhaps not as in Central Asia).

He resolutely does not accept only clearly anti-Russian pages of national history.

The difference between Lukashenko's regime even from the despotisms of Central Asia is that his regime is pro-Russian.

He came to power on this, and he is still holding on to this.

— Lukashenko came to power in 1994 with such approaches.

Was society different?

And has it become different?

In 2020, it was very interesting with the white-red-white flag.

Casting of symbols was carried out - first there was "tapak" ("stop cockroach"), then "heart - fist - sign of victory", then a white ribbon.

And that's not all.

And both Babaryka and Tikhonovskaya, if they did not shun the white-red-white flag, they did not welcome it too much.

And then, when the protests started, how it broke.

The flag won this symbol casting.

Karbalevich:

In 1994 and a little later, Lukashenka's ideas corresponded to the ideas of, if not the majority, then many.

At the time, Lukashenka's idea of ​​integration with Russia involved the rejection of Yeltsin's reforms.

He felt that such sentiments are also popular in Russian society.

Any politician, if he is in power for a long time, loses an adequate sense of reality.

And 2020 was a vivid illustration of this thesis.

At that time, Lukashenka chose the worst of all possible solutions, including for him personally.

And he was very surprised to see that the society is different.

And the only conclusion he made from this was that everything should be suppressed.

- Alexander, in your opinion, how has the attitude of society changed?

Is it the same as Lukashenka's?

Or has it become the opposite and BNR has become a value for the majority?

Or is it a split, a split based on values?

Pashkevich:

Rather, it is a split.

It cannot be said that society is now firmly against the BNR.

But it is not that it loves and respects the BNR.

A significant part of society already believes that BNR is important.

There is a good part that supports Lukashenka and shares his views, including on history.

And there is a part (maybe the majority, or at least half) for whom this issue is not so acute.

I would share the general opposition mood and attitude towards national symbols and history.

The number of Lukashenka's opponents, who opposed him in 2020 and have opposition sentiments to this day, is much larger than those who do it from national positions.

Between the edges, the poles, there is a struggle for the middle.

Lukashenko is trying to impose his views by force, and his opponents are trying to convince this middle ground.

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• Yuri Drakakhrust

  Journalist of Radio Svaboda

  
  

  drakakhrusty@rferl.org

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