Hongkong.

(file photo)

◎Stephen M. Young

Let's start with the results.

The sad truth is that the Beijing government has trampled on its solemn promise to allow Hong Kong a great deal of autonomy for at least fifty years.

This move means that the People's Republic of China has left behind the promises Deng Xiaoping made to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the world in the early 1980s.

At the time, Beijing, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his successors, seemed intent on pursuing equal coexistence with the West.

Please read on...

I am still puzzled by China's recent policy shift.

Is this because Beijing sees Hong Kong as an existential threat to the entire Chinese nation?

Or is it because Hong Kong is deeply influenced by the British legal system and has an open and free economic system, which is unbearable to the paranoid bureaucrats in Beijing?

Or is it because Beijing's strongman leader, Xi Jinping, simply believes that it doesn't matter what promises his predecessors make as long as they stand in the way of his imperial cause?

Perhaps the answer is all of the above.

I have also been thinking about the impact of those "mainland" people who come to Hong Kong for business or pleasure in an endless stream.

How do these visitors feel about ethnically and culturally Chinese Hong Kong, which enthusiastically embraces many universal values ​​that seem intimidating to its reclusive leadership in the Forbidden City?

Beijing Government Systematically Destroys Hong Kong's Charm

Whatever the reason, over the past few years, Mr. Xi’s Beijing government appears to have begun systematically destroying Hong Kong’s long-standing charm as a magnet for global business people and companies looking for business opportunities there.

After the former British colony "returned" to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, Beijing promised that Hong Kong's institutions would not change.

The question is what has changed in Hong Kong?

Why does this vibrant commercial and financial center make Xi Jinping so uneasy?

Hong Kong's situation is particularly puzzling at a time when so many Chinese citizens are traveling the world and doing business with success.

Allow me to share my personal experience in Hong Kong.

I have traveled to and worked in this former British colony many times over the past forty years.

The first time I went to Hong Kong was in the fall of 1982, when I was asked to return to Washington from my Foreign Service Assignment in the Taipei office of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to serve on the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Board of the State Department. Bureau "China Division" (China Desk).

My new bosses wanted me to familiarize myself with the situation in Hong Kong before returning to the United States.

So I flew from Taipei to Hong Kong and spent a few days talking to friends in the consulate and meeting with various Hong Kong government officials.

The U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong and Macau at the time was Burt Levin.

Hong Kong's economic prosperity and trade boom before the handover

Friends at the consulate also arranged for me to meet British diplomats in Hong Kong, who were clearly anxious about China's demands to negotiate the terms of the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, but for most of us that seemed to be in the distant future thing.

At the same time, Hong Kong's prosperous economy and buoyant trade impress me deeply.

Taking the historic Star Ferry (Star Ferry) from Hong Kong Island across Victoria Harbor to Kowloon is also an unparalleled experience.

Then, I set off for the US embassy and consulate in China. During the 36-hour train ride from Guangzhou to Beijing, I looked out the train window and was shocked by the backwardness of the surrounding countryside.

I saw farmers dragging their plows on their bodies because they couldn't afford draft animals.

Another major feature of Chinese agriculture at the time was the use of manure for fertilization, as more refined fertilizers were not available.

I still remember the sights and smells of China at that time, when the country was just beginning to shed the shackles of the Mao era and struggled to reintegrate into the modern world.

The Chinese officials I met in Beijing seemed eager to improve relations with Washington, in part to offset the threat posed by Moscow, which was still deeply alienated from China.

For the next three decades, I traveled to Hong Kong regularly, as my diplomatic career centered on Greater China and the Soviet Union.

During my career, I have served on the China Section twice.

When I first took office, I was an official in charge of Hong Kong affairs.

Later, when I was the chief of the China Section, I was responsible for supervising all American diplomatic personnel stationed in China, and the relationship between the United States and Hong Kong became an important part of my work.

From 2010 to 2013, I served as the Consul General of the United States in Hong Kong and Macau. I regard this assignment as the happy end of my 33-year career as a diplomat.

After I left Hong Kong and returned to the United States to officially retire, I often had the opportunity to return to Hong Kong.

During my tenure as U.S. Consul General, I have had great relationships with people across the spectrum.

For example, I had a friendly exchange with Lu Xinhua, the special commissioner of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong at the time.

I also met with Peng Qinghua, then secretary of the Hong Kong Working Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and director of the Liaison Office of the State Council in Hong Kong (Liaison Office) from time to time.

Although we don't always see eye to eye, we all respect each other's ideas.

However, at the end of my assignment in Hong Kong, Zhang Xiaoming succeeded Peng Qinghua as the director of the Liaison Office.

Zhang Xiaoming showed a tougher attitude towards Hong Kong, refused to meet with me, and showed contempt for foreign diplomatic envoys in various ways.

Doing so appears to have helped his career, as he was later promoted to a more prestigious post as director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council.

However, after the "anti-extradition" protest broke out in Hong Kong in 2019-20, he was demoted to deputy director.

From this point of view, there still seems to be some degree of accountability within the CCP.

Xi wants full control over decision to castrate Hong Kong

To understand China today, we must first focus on the role of the supreme "party and state leader" Xi Jinping, who continues to concentrate all major powers in his own hands.

Could it be that Xi Jinping is so insecure about his position that he can't stand Hong Kong being seen as an open and internationally oriented center for trade and investment?

Because such a Hong Kong makes it impossible for Xi Jinping to fully control it like in the North?

While China's political system is cryptic, it seems to me that this is why Xi Jinping decided to castrate Hong Kong from being a separate economic fiefdom within his sprawling kingdom.

However, doing so has come at a high cost.

First, Hong Kong's character as a center of free-market enterprise, based on the rule of law and international business standards, has seriously faded, if not completely zeroed out.

Second, it sends a clear signal to Taiwan.

Let us recall that Deng Xiaoping proposed "one country, two systems" in the early 1980s with the aim of dispelling Taiwan's doubts. Just like Hong Kong's "return" to China, cross-strait reunification will not fundamentally change Taiwan's system.

Beijing's specific commitment is that, under Deng Xiaoping's concept, the former British colony will enjoy broad autonomy for at least fifty years, that is, until 2047.

Deng Xiaoping wanted to allay Taiwan's concerns. He hoped that the people of Taiwan would at least be prepared to gradually increase economic and political ties with China. In the longer term, he hoped that Taiwan would benefit politically and economically from cross-strait exchanges and interactions.

As I write this in 2023, it all seems like a distant memory.

Deng Xiaoping promised to give Hong Kong autonomy for 24 years, but it is already hard to see the difference between today's Hong Kong and the busy cities in southeast China such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou.

Both have significant economic power, but mainland China remains under the yoke of Beijing's authoritarian government.

In other words, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish Hong Kong, which has been greatly deprived of political freedom, from the rest of China.

Many people who could afford to flee Hong Kong have gone: those with the means to fly, those without to take the boat, destined for Taiwan or Southeast Asia, because the local Chinese community generally welcomes them and the business skills they bring.

This is reminiscent of the "boat people" who fled Vietnam after the fall of Saigon in 1975.

While fleeing brings the opportunity to regain freedom, it also tears families apart, causing lasting pain on all levels.

These days, the Chinese government is putting more and more obstacles in the way of immigration from Hong Kong, and those who stay are said to feel oppressed.

"One Country, Two Systems" Appeal Lost

At the same time, if "one country, two systems" once had any appeal to the 24 million people of Taiwan (Republic of China), it is now gone.

Based on my personal experience of living and working in Taiwan for many years, I have believed from the very beginning that unless China's political system undergoes drastic changes, the people of Taiwan will simply not buy into Beijing's lures.

In fact, Taiwan is currently accelerating its military build-up in the event that Mr. Xi may one day decide to launch a full-scale invasion, which is not out of reach.

Like I said before, invading Taiwan is not as simple as it seems.

Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan and China are separated by nearly a hundred miles of high seas.

I also think that the spirit of democracy in Taiwan is more entrenched now.

Despite fierce competition among the major political parties, China's economic and political system has virtually no market in Taiwan.

Mr. Xi, this is your credit.

(Author Yang Sudi, from 2006 to 2009 served as the Director of the Taipei Office of the American Institute in Taiwan, and from 2010 to 2013 served as the Consul General of the United States in Hong Kong and Macau. Translated by Sun Yuqing of the International News Center)

Weekly Monograph on Yang Sudi