The British "Financial Times" reported that China is obstructing the laying and maintenance of submarine cables passing through the South China Sea.

(Schematic diagram, AFP file photo)

[Compiled by Chen Chengliang/Comprehensive Report] Two submarine cables connecting Taiwan to Matsu were cut off last month, causing serious disruption to the Internet for Matsu residents: The British "Financial Times" also disclosed last week that China is obstructing the laying and maintenance of submarine cables passing through the South China Sea plan, and spread to projects in which Taiwan participated in the investment.

China's aggression is reaching out to submarine cables. How Taiwan can hold the lifeline of the Internet has become the focus of attention.

Voice of America (VOA) quoted experts on the 22nd and pointed out that China has extended gray zone tactics to the seabed and normalized them. Taiwan’s 14 cables connecting the global network are easy targets for China’s attacks. Taiwan should work with its allies to formulate Contingency plans and consideration of countermeasures.

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The report pointed out that modern submarine cables use fiber-optic technology to wrap wires with insulating materials and lay them on the seabed for telecommunications or power transmission between countries or regions.

More than 97 percent of global communications still travel via cables deep under the sea.

It also mentions how China is weaponizing cables.

Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan, scholars of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), wrote a letter to "The Hill" (The Hill), stating that the Beijing authorities may blockade Taiwan from the sea and air, and cut off Taiwan's ties with Taiwan. The submarine cables needed to connect the world.

Lonnie Henry, former East Asia Defense Intelligence Officer of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, issued a document on the 11th that when the People’s Liberation Army blocks Taiwan, the initial missile and air strikes will include long-range communication facilities, such as satellite ground stations and submarine cable landing points, as well as Use counter-space technology to attack communications satellites, with subsequent strikes targeting Taiwan's mobile and backup communications equipment.

"If China cuts off communication channels and prevents military and civilian supplies from sea and air, Taiwan may eventually have to surrender."

According to a report released by the Mercatus Center of George Mason University in August last year, Taiwan's submarine cable landing sites are located in New Taipei City, Toucheng, and Fangshan.

Submarine cable landing stations are one of China's strategic interests in the event of a war between the two sides of the Strait, but they are poorly protected and vulnerable to attack.

Joseph Hwang, a visiting professor at George Mason University in the United States and an expert in cyber security, told VOA that in an aggression scenario, China may use submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) to locate and cut submarine cables, launch Cyberattacks disrupting data flow or intercepting sensitive information, as well as using devices that generate electromagnetic pulses (EMP) to disrupt undersea cables or the infrastructure connected to them.

Huang Jizhen suggested that Taiwan, the United States and Asian allies can take the following measures to protect submarine cables and underwater advantages, including joint patrols or setting up task forces with regional partners, sharing intelligence and coordinating strikes; strengthening infrastructure construction and investing in cable armor , deep-buried, and decoy cables; underscore the importance of global communications infrastructure to trade, security, and economic stability in diplomacy over submarine cable protection standards and protocols; establish legal and policy frameworks that clearly explain “accidental” or vandalism The consequences of underwater cables, and working with international organizations to create accountability.