Briefly:

  • Minsk and Warsaw went in different directions in the sea of ​​geopolitics.

  • I do not think that in the short term we can expect any concessions from Lukashenka.

  • Many did not like him as "the last dictator of Europe", but until 2020 he still defended the independence of Belarus

  • Lukashenko crossed too many "red lines" in relations with the West.

- How, in your opinion, can the official relations between Minsk and Warsaw be characterized strategically?

What stage are they in and what political term do they most correspond to?

- Naturally, I will not say anything new if I testify that there is no good neighborliness, trust and mutual understanding in these relations.

Rather, it is the other way around.

It's just that both Minsk and Warsaw completely drifted in different directions in the sea of ​​geopolitics.

Different values, different directions.

We support Ukraine, Lukashenka supports Russia.

Kamil Klysinsky

In bilateral relations, rebukes from Minsk continue (they are very old, by the way, but now they sound more intense) that we allegedly want to take the "Eastern Kresy" from Belarus.

This is complete nonsense, without any basis.

Lukashenka is a very Soviet person, he lives in his Soviet reserve.

The last article Andrzej Pachobut wrote before his arrest was about Lukashenka's anti-Polish sentiments.

And I agree with this assessment of Pachobut.

— Yes, in 2019, in an interview for Svaboda, Andrzej Pachobut also talked about Lukashenka's polianophobia.

https://www.svaboda.org/a/29873178.html But to what extent is the anti-Polishness of the leader of Belarus known in Polish society today?

Do the majority of Poles perceive him simply as an abstract dictator, like Hussein or Gaddafi, who primarily tortures his own people?

Or is he perceived precisely as an enemy of Poland?

- I don't think that most people in Poland understand that Lukashenka does not like Poles.

To understand this, you need to deeply study Belarus.

Ordinary citizens know that there is such a mustachioed dictator who says strange things.

Sometimes it looks funny, but he tortures his own people.

Most Poles don't go into details.

— Can Poland finally block all border crossings on the Polish-Belarusian border?

Who will it bring more harm to - Poland or Belarus?

There is an expression in chess: "A threat is worse than its execution."

Maybe Warsaw believes that the threat of this action will force Minsk to come to its senses?

— I think that so far there are no signs that Lukashenka can retreat from his policy.

He will continue because he is not interested in real dialogue.

Those decisions that have already been taken about border crossings result from the disagreement of the Polish authorities with what Lukashenka is doing with the Belarusian society.

Not only with Andrzej Pachobut and the Polish minority, but with the entire Belarusian people.

Repression, political prisoners and this further.

This is also Warsaw's disagreement with the fact that Lukashenka put his country at the complete disposal of the Russian army.

We are not reassured by the fact that he did not introduce his army into Ukraine.

Because he did not do it because he wants to negotiate with the West, he is afraid for his power.

Therefore, due to the lack of trust, due to the fact that Belarus has become a staging ground for the Russian army, due to the fact that the dictatorship is getting stronger, Warsaw made such decisions.

But I do not think that in the short term we can expect any concessions from Lukashenka.

- But can't China hint to Lukashenka that it is necessary to make peace with Poland, at least for the sole purpose of not allowing the border to be closed, to ensure the stability of the transit of Chinese goods to Europe through Belarus?

Although a small share of Chinese goods passes through Belarus, Beijing needs stability on all transit routes, especially against the background of the war in Ukraine.

- I think China did not demand this publicly, because it is not in their political traditions, but it is clear that it expects it.

Even before 2020, China highly rated Belarus as a convenient corridor for the transit of goods.

Chinese investments in Belarus were also connected with transit.

Now, in this sense, Belarus is losing its transit importance in the eyes of its Chinese comrades.

But putting pressure on Lukashenka openly is not their style.

I think that between the lines they made him understand that it was necessary to provide transit.

- Recently, in an interview with Svaboda, the expert of the Polish Strategy and Future Analytical Center Marek Budis said that the current strategy of the Belarusian opposition may lead to the loss of statehood.

And the Belarusian democratic forces should think about it.

"Lack of democracy is a temporary problem.

And what can unite part of the government and the opposition is precisely the real threat from Russia."

Does this approach reflect the view of official Warsaw and what is your attitude to these thoughts?

- Marek Budisz is an independent analyst, has no connection with the Polish authorities and expresses only his own opinion.

I categorically disagree with his opinion.

I think that you should not copy outdated stamps.

What Marek said was relevant until 2020, when Lukashenka was really considered the guarantor of Belarusian independence.

Many did not like him as "the last dictator of Europe", but he still defended the independence of Belarus.

He took certain steps in the direction of strengthening sovereignty, there were steps in support of the Belarusian language, certain steps in historical politics.

After August 2020, all this was buried, Lukashenka became a vassal of Russia.

Of course, he was dependent to a certain extent before, but after 2020 he is already completely dependent on Moscow.

I would say that now Lukashenka is a threat to Belarusian independence.

It is impossible to talk and negotiate with him about the preservation of independence, because he himself threatens this independence.

And I don't think it's worth trying to talk to him.

- What then can be the strategy in relation to Lukashenka, what remains for the West and the Belarusian opposition?

Only fight this regime to the end and not make any compromises?

Should we assume that such a situation could arise if we have to negotiate with him?

How do you see this dilemma?

- This is primarily the dilemma of the Belarusian opposition.

I watch from the side and see it as nothing has changed.

The ultimate goal of all sanctions and general pressure on the Minsk regime is the release of police prisoners and the organization of free elections without Lukashenka.

I urge us to think more often about what Belarus will be like after Lukashenka.

Now he is de facto running the country, and we have to take that into account.

But it is necessary to pay attention to what Lukashenka is relying on, which is primarily the power sector and Russia, which is itself under sanctions and unsuccessfully waging a war in Ukraine.

This indicates that at a certain moment the dynamics of changes can turn out to be very fast.

Although it is difficult to predict.

— Lukashenka (through his envoys and diplomats) often scared the West that if he was gone, a more pro-Russian politician would come.

And this partially had its effect, in 2019-2020 the West actually refused to seriously support the opposition and placed a certain bet on Lukashenka as a defender of sovereignty.

Can't Lukashenka start this song again now: "If not me, then Moscow will replace me with a general and simply annex Belarus"?

— Yes, Volfovich can definitely replace Lukashenka.

I can well imagine it, and Russia will be satisfied with it one hundred percent.

Lukashenko has already done so much, crossed so many red lines in relations with the West, that it is hard for me to imagine that there could be something worse than him.

And it seems to me that he has lost that trump card that you are talking about, that, they say, he is the best option.

He can't say that about himself anymore.

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  • Vitaly Tsygankov

    Vitaly Tsygankov graduated from the Faculty of Journalism of BSU.

    One of the two founders of the first non-governmental news agency BelaPAN.

    He worked in "Zvyazda" newspapers, was a correspondent in Belarus of the Russian "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", Associated Press, columnist in "Svaboda" newspaper.

    On Belarusian Freedom since 1994.

    Correspondent of Russian Freedom in Belarus.


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