Scholars believe that in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China's "China's position on a political solution to the Ukrainian crisis" towards Ukraine is not aimed at bringing peace back to Europe.

These 12 points have almost nothing to do with ending the Russia-Ukraine war, but to a large extent they create conditions for winning the war against Taiwan in the future.

The picture shows Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

(Associated Press file photo)

[Central News Agency] China issued a 12-point position statement on the Ukraine crisis on February 24, which is regarded as the Chinese version of the "Ukraine Peace Plan".

Scholars believe that China advocates peace in Europe on the surface, but in fact it wants to use this to create conditions and eventually win the war against Taiwan.

Craig Singleton, a scholar at the Washington think tank "Foundation for Defense of Democracies", wrote in the "Foreign Policy" (Foreign Policy) magazine that 12 months after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, China seems to be no longer Has the ability to influence the outcome of a war as early as it did.

Beijing is now largely reduced to a bystander, and the main role has become to extend the financial lifeline for Moscow by purchasing more discounted Russian crude oil and coal.

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But at present, it seems that such measures are aimed at ensuring that Russia can maintain its wartime economic needs, rather than helping Moscow win the war.

Similarly, China's "China's position on a political solution to the Ukrainian crisis" against Ukraine is not aimed at bringing peace back to Europe.

These 12 points have almost nothing to do with ending the Russia-Ukraine war, but to a large extent, they create conditions for winning the war against Taiwan in the future.

In other words, China understands that Russia failed in Ukraine for the same reasons it threatened China's ultimate unity.

The focus of China's peace plan is to ask Western countries to abandon the "Cold War mentality" and avoid "group confrontation."

Under the cover of an attitude of trying to ease the military conflict, China's real motive is actually to hope that Russia will eventually win without the continued support of the United States and Europe.

China's preferred balance of military power also applies to contingencies in Taiwan.

If the two sides confront each other head-on, China can easily win, but if Taiwan can obtain foreign military equipment, training and real-time intelligence like Ukraine, it is still uncertain who will win or lose.

Another focus of attention is that the plan is completely opposed to unilateral sanctions that China believes violate international law.

As an alternative, China hopes that the United Nations Security Council, where China and Russia have veto powers, will hold a multilateral debate on the measures.

Sanctions against Russia, led by the United States and the European Union (EU), have undoubtedly made China more concerned that one day they, too, may run into economic difficulties.

Russia is now turning to economically stronger China for support, but should the tide turn, Beijing is largely on its own.

China is well aware of this, so it has made more efforts to enhance its self-sufficiency, such as establishing a RMB-based commodity trading plan, etc., in order to avoid economic sanctions.

The "maintaining industry and supply chain stability" in the peace plan is also due to fear of sanctions.

With Chinese companies, big or small, state-backed or ostensibly private, terrified to cross the sanctions threshold, it's not hard to see how China's drive to escape Western export controls is ongoing.

By linking itself to global value chains in a way Russia has never done before, China hopes to wield influence over Western deliberations over Taiwan, rather than being muted like Russia.

The peace plan has two priorities: "cessation of hostilities" and "respect for the sovereignty of all countries". The former reflects that Beijing knows that Russia cannot continue to suffer and must regroup; A reasonable explanation for why the invasion of Ukraine's borders is not a violation of Kiev's sovereignty.

But this is largely different from the situation facing Beijing, because China believes that Taiwan has no border with China, nor does Taiwan have sovereignty, at least as far as international law is concerned, China's claim holds water.

Taiwan's exclusion from the United Nations system, coupled with the West's insistence on "one China" and formal recognition of Taipei's dwindling network, make Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, likely to have limited recourse to international legal recourse should Taiwan be invaded.

All in all, Beijing correctly understands that any plan to seize Taiwan, or at least any plan with the least risk, will be premised on the fulfillment and subsequent maintenance of the 12 conditions of the Ukrainian peace plan.

In recent years, Washington has made great strides in strengthening the Indo-Pacific alliance network and improving coordination and enhancing the capabilities of regional partners, while working to reduce China's dominance in certain industrial supply chains and reduce Beijing's ability to use its key minerals to promote foreign policy objectives , but much work remains to be done to undermine China's other strategic pillars.

The top priority for Western countries headed by the United States is to establish a strong sanctions regime, which will be automatically triggered once China mobilizes troops to invade Taiwan.

Western democracies must also selectively deepen trade and industrial ties with Taiwan to effectively reduce Taiwan's economic dependence on China, while using their influence to support Taiwan's legitimate participation in international organizations.

The last point, and the most controversial point, is that Western countries must consider using China's core weakness as a weapon, threatening to target China's high dependence on foreign countries for food.

Food is arguably the commodity most associated with China's political stability, and the one most likely to cast doubt on Xi Jinping's intrusive calculations.

As Putin learned the hard way, starting a war based on false assumptions is not only difficult to win, but can also lead to stalemate.

Weakening the assumptions of Xi Jinping's showdown with Taiwan may be the best way to avoid it altogether.