US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin signaled on February 14 that the 54 member states of the Defense Contact Group for Ukraine would continue to support Ukraine in the long term.

Austin said the Contact Group for the Defense of Ukraine (a coalition of 54 countries supporting Ukraine's defense) would "support Ukraine's long-term freedom struggle" and support Ukraine during the spring counteroffensive.

All about the topic:

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The Washington Post reported on February 13 that the administration of US President Joe Biden will announce a new aid package for Ukraine "in the next week".

This is stated in the daily analysis of the situation in Ukraine by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

The Washington Post reported that US officials have signaled privately to Ukraine that Western security assistance to Ukraine, however, is limited.

An anonymous US government official said that US government officials are trying to "suggest to Ukrainian officials that the US government cannot do anything forever."

The latest Western aid packages for Ukraine were Kiev's best chance to decisively change the course of the war.

Western sources indicate that there remain concerns in the West about Ukraine's determination to retain Bakhmut.

The Washington Post also reported that US defense planners assessed that Ukrainian forces were unable to simultaneously defend Bakhmut and launch a spring counteroffensive, and urged Ukraine to prioritize the spring counteroffensive over the defense of Bakhmut.

ISW continues to believe that Ukraine's decision to protect Bakhmut is likely to be a strategically sound effort, despite the cost to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut forced the Kremlin to expend much of the Wagner group as a force and commit high-value Russian airborne forces to sustain the grueling advance.

Zelensky admitted: The situation in Eastern Ukraine "remains extremely difficult"

The Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut has crippled significant Russian forces and is likely to create favorable conditions for a future Ukrainian counteroffensive.

If Russian troops had captured Bakhmut without significant Ukrainian resistance, they could hope to expand their operations in ways that would force Ukraine to hastily build defensive positions in less favorable terrain.

Therefore, defending Bakhmut from Ukraine and undertaking efforts to create the conditions for a counteroffensive are likely to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive activities.

Given that Russian forces would have continued their offensive beyond Bakhmut if Ukraine surrendered the city earlier.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly recruiting prisoners and mimicking the Wagner group's treatment of prisoners as cannon fodder.

CNN reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense directly recruited prisoners who were stationed in Soledar, Donetsk region, in formations of the 2nd Army Corps of the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) in October 2022.

The convicts complained to CNN about their experience after being ordered to storm Ukrainian defense positions.

CNN also obtained a recording from a deceased prisoner who feared the Russian MoD would execute him after surviving an attack on Soledar, even though that soldier was killed in action days later anyway.

These convicts specified that the Russian MoD recruited them after the group initially ignored them and even accused Russian forces of conducting deliberate friendly fire against the convicts.

The Russian Defense Ministry's decision to recruit prisoners is an indicator that the Kremlin is seeking to exploit prisoners for future human-wave attacks in a similar manner to Wagner, despite the prisoners' limited combat effectiveness.

The representative of the Main Directorate of Military Intelligence of Ukraine, Andriy Usov, said that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, were creating a cannon fodder prison reserve that they could control directly through private military companies of the Ministry of Defense.

The integration of these Russian MoD prison forces into LPR formations may also suggest that Russian military commanders are trying to avoid restructuring some of their conventional units to accommodate under-trained prisoners.

The ISW has previously observed instances of Russian proxy militias being mistreated by Russian conventional forces, and the Russian command may have tried not to further demoralize the unit by integrating prisoners.

The recruitment of prisoners by the Russian MoD in autumn 2022 may also coincide with increasing criticism from the group's financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Prigogine began publicly attacking Russian military commanders in early October, and Russian MoD interference in his recruitment scheme may have fueled some of these grievances with the conventional Russian army and MoD bureaucracy.

A representative of the Russian prison group Gulagu.net also noted that many in Moscow have come to fear Prigozhin and his unpredictable and ever-growing large "organized criminal group of mercenaries and murderers."

Since then, the Kremlin has distanced itself from "Wagner" - both rhetorically and by possibly depriving Prigogine of the ability to recruit and train prisoners.

The Ukrainian General Staff, for example, reported that the Russian Defense Ministry began using the Kadamovsky training ground in the Rostov region for training conscripts and volunteers for several weeks, while the Wagner could not train at the training ground from the beginning of 2023.

Russian military officials are likely trying to publicly appear to be paying attention to the emerging grievances of mobilized Russian personnel.

Russia's human rights ombudsman, Tatiana Moskalkova, claims to have sent a call to Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov to investigate complaints from mobilized officers from the Republic of Tatarstan.

Moskalkova likely referred to an appeal by elements of the 1231st Regiment from Tatarstan, who had previously complained of being mistreated as cannon fodder and lacking military equipment after being assigned to the command of unspecified elements of the 1st Army Corps of Donetsk People's Republic (DPR).

The mobilized men of the 1231st Regiment filed a formal complaint that the DPR command had designated the mobilized men as a disposable assault force, after which Russian commanders reportedly withdrew the 1231st Regiment.

However, relatives of servicemen from the 1231st Regiment reported that the mobilized servicemen had distributed the petition signatories to different units, with some subordinated to DPR command, possibly as a punitive measure.

Russia's Ministry of Defense (MoD) has announced that the Kremlin cannot formally end Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial mobilization order, arguing that rescinding the order would result in Russians losing their mobilization allowances and financial compensation.

The Kremlin and the Russian Defense Ministry are likely to oppose any decree formally ending mobilization, as it would allow mobilized Russians to return home from the front lines.

The Russian Ministry of Defense likely framed mobilization as a legal basis for compensation in an attempt to mislead Russians who advocated an official end to mobilization.

The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian officials were trying to mobilize scientists at the Polyus Scientific Research Institute by advertising bonuses and social benefits for mobilized people.

The Russian Ministry of Defense continues its crypto-mobilization practices, prompting the United States State Department to warn US-Russian dual citizens to refrain from traveling to Russia to avoid mobilization on February 13.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded to the US warning, saying that while no new wave of mobilization was planned in Russia, dual nationals in Russia were "first and foremost Russians".

Thus, Peskov's statement indicates that the Kremlin will consider recruiting or mobilizing dual citizens.

Russian opposition publication Meduza reported that the Baikonur city administration is offering 260,000 rubles ($3,530) to residents of Baikonur, Kazakhstan (a city that Russia leases for a Russian-controlled spaceport there) to participate in the war in Ukraine.

Meduza reported that the Baikonur city administration announced in September 2022 that it would not allow the Kremlin to mobilize residents against their will.

The Kremlin continues to withdraw forces and military equipment from its northwestern-most borders with NATO to support Russia's war in Ukraine.

Norwegian intelligence chief Nils Andreas Stensjones told The Barents Observer that Russian ground forces on the Kola Peninsula in northwestern Russia had been reduced to a fifth of their original strength before the invasion of Ukraine.

Stensønes estimated that approximately three Russian battalion tactical groups (approximately 3,000 troops) stationed on the Kola Peninsula participated in the Russian invasion, of which up to half of their assigned personnel died in action.

Stensjones estimated that the Russian Northern Fleet had lost up to 100 tanks and armored vehicles.

The Kremlin's decision to deploy troops far from Russia's borders, which are closest to NATO, supports ISW's long-standing assessment that the Kremlin is unconcerned about NATO's conventional military threat against Russia.

Russian forces - especially undertrained mobilized personnel - continue to suffer heavy casualties as Russia ramps up its offensive operations in the Donbass.

An investigation by the BBC, the Russian opposition media outlet Mediazona and volunteers reported that of the 14,093 confirmed Russian deaths during the invasion.

1,082 Russian mobilized servicemen were killed in action.

40 percent of them died in the first weeks of 2023.

The report noted that obituary dates for mobilized personnel in October indicated that the troops trained for three to seven days.

The report stated that Russian forces used soldiers trained in one specialty in another specialty on the frontline, indicating a poor allocation of resources, a lack of cohesion and a lack of preparation for planning.

Russian officials continue to integrate the occupied territories into the Russian system of governance.

The head of the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) Leonid Pasechnik and the head of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) Denis Pushilin said on February 14 that the Kremlin is hosting a training course on civil service and management of the integration process for more than 6,000 current and future occupiers authorities in Russia Higher School of Public Administration at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russia initiated this program and brought in large numbers of Russian civil servants to fill the shortage of local collaborators.

More than 80 percent of the 6,000 "specialists" who will graduate from the program will reportedly be Russian.

Russian Federation Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova said on the issue on February 13 that 60 specialists from the DPR and LPR will complete a one-week internship in child advocacy in Moscow.

The head of the occupation administration of Zaporozhye Oblast, Yevgeny Balitsky, said on February 14 that the Committee on Economic Policy of the Council of the Federation of Russia met to discuss the economic development and integration of Zaporozhye Oblast.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on February 14 that members of the Atesh Ukrainian-Tatar guerrilla group carried out an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a car carrying two Russian soldiers and two representatives of Russian special services in Nova Kakhovka, occupied Kherson area.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center said the explosion killed two and left two in serious condition.

A local Ukrainian Telegram channel claimed the attack took place on February 10 in front of a Russian occupation police station.

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Russia-Ukraine war