Eighth in the world

In the last years of the USSR, both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were based on the territory of the then BSSR.

Strategic (the missile's range is more than 10,000 km) had 81 warheads.

Tactical nuclear weapons consisted of more than 1,200 warheads.

Each tank division had a missile division that could deliver a tactical nuclear strike from several (usually four) launchers, the range of the missile was up to 120-130 km.

Anti-aircraft units and aviation based on the territory of the republic also had nuclear weapons.

At the time of the declaration of independence in 1991, the nuclear arsenal of Belarus was the 8th largest in the world.

The idea of ​​non-nuclear was dictated by Chernobyl

Already in the first documents of the Belarusian People's Front (BPF) of 1988-89, it was mentioned the need to declare Belarus a nuclear-free territory, which was largely connected with the environmental and psychological consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

However, it was impossible to solve this problem within the USSR, because the Armed Forces were subordinated to Moscow.

In May 1990, the BPF developed and presented to the Supreme Council session in June a draft of the Declaration of Independence, which provided for the actual withdrawal from the USSR and, among other things, the nuclear-free status of Belarus.

The project was rejected by the communist majority, but some provisions of the BNF deputies were adopted in a document known as the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the BSSR.

Article 10 of the Declaration provided that "the BSSR aims to make its territory a nuclear-free zone, and the republic a neutral state."

On August 25, 1991, the Declaration was given the status of a constitutional law.

Russia has said that it is leaving control to itself

In the first days of Belarus' independence, the Russian leadership made it clear that it intended to leave the formations of the Strategic Forces under its control.

Nuclear warheads were also located on the territory of Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

During 1991-1993.

on the territory of Belarus there were more than 30,000 soldiers of the Russian Strategic Forces, whose social security was mainly provided by the Belarusian budget.

, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, expressed his intention to get rid of nuclear weapons

on January 9, 1991, during the signing of the Białowieża Agreements in Viskuly, and later confirmed it on December 21, 1991 at the summit of the heads of the republics of the former USSR in Alma-Ata.

Paradox of nuclear disarmament

It may seem paradoxical, but tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn earlier than strategic ones - tactical warheads left the territory of Belarus in the spring of 1992, and strategic ones four and a half years later, in the fall of 1996.

"Red phone" in Shushkevich's office

According to the agreement, the president of Russia could make a decision on the use of strategic nuclear weapons after notifying the leaders of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

In Shushkevich's office on the fifth floor of the building on Karl Marx, there was a telephone under a plastic case - it was a device for direct communication with

in case of a threat of nuclear conflict.

According to Shushkevich, he called him only a few times when the quality of the connection was being checked, while another line was used for conversations with Yeltsin.

Stanislav Shushkevich and Barys Yeltsin

Political sham

However, it was clear, and Shushkevich did not hide it, that the Russian president has the technical ability to use nuclear weapons without any consultation with the head of Belarus.

Neither the Supreme Soviet, nor the government, nor the Ministry of Defense of Belarus had the opportunity to order the use of nuclear warheads, or to prevent their use if such an order came from Moscow.

Thus, the promise of the president of the Russian Federation agreeing on the intention to use nuclear weapons with the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine looked like a political sham.

Belarus as a target

There was an ambiguous situation: Belarus had no opportunity to influence the Kremlin's order to launch a nuclear strike with strategic missiles from its territory, but it would receive an inevitable nuclear strike in response on its territory.

In addition, the presence of Russian nuclear warheads made Belarus a potential target for a preemptive nuclear strike.

What is the Lisbon Protocol

On May 23, 1992, in Lisbon, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, the USA and Ukraine signed an additional agreement to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons (SNU-1).

According to this protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine were recognized as successors of the USSR regarding the SNU-1 Treaty.

At the same time, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine undertook to get rid of nuclear weapons and, as non-nuclear states, to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was signed on July 1, 1968 in New York.

In the international legal sense, the decision on the nuclear-free status of Belarus should have been the ratification by the Supreme Council not only of the Lisbon Protocol, but of a package of documents.

For this purpose, the following documents were presented to the Supreme Council on February 4, 1993:

• bill "On Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons of July 31, 1991 and the Protocol (Lisbon Protocol. — Ed.) on the Accession of the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1 1968";

• the draft law "On the ratification of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on coordination of activities in the military sphere dated July 20, 1992";

• bill "On the ratification of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on strategic forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus".

Closed session of the Supreme Council

On February 4, 1993, deputies discussed the issue of ratification of the Lisbon Protocol at a closed session of the Supreme Council.

There were several such sessions during the six years of the existence of the Supreme Council of the 12th convocation, among them was the consideration of the issue of the State Security Committee in the same 1993 and the discussion of the extradition of former communist leaders to Lithuania in January 1994 (it was at this session that Lukashenka raised the issue of Shushkevich's resignation ).

The Oval Hall was attended only by deputies, heads of the government, some ministers and employees of the Supreme Soviet, who were responsible for the voting system.

The broadcast, which usually went to the offices of the House of Government, was turned off.

There was no telerecording or photography of the meeting, but there was an audio recording (for the transcript).

In addition to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Stanislav Shushkevich, the Minister of Defense

and the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Kravchenko said that if Ukraine imposed certain conditions on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, Belarus does so without any conditions.

In general, there was agreement among the deputies regarding the ratification of the agreements.

All proposed bills were adopted in closed session.

Shushkevich activated the process

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Stanislau Shushkevich, was a supporter of removing nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus as soon as possible, as he stated at the sessions of the parliament and in an interview.

He expressed the same position to US President

during his visit to Washington in the summer of 1992.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Shushkevich was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for this.

Pazniak advised not to hurry

The Chairman of the BPF Opposition

did not question the need for a nuclear-free status of Belarus in the future, especially since this idea was first expressed by the BPF in the late 80s.

However, he preferred not to make a hasty decision and motivated it by the threat of imperial revenge from Russia.

Alexander Lukashenko and Zyanon Pazniak in the Supreme Council

Lukashenka voted "for"

On February 4, 1993, the deputy from the Mogilev-Shklov constituency No. 310, the director of the Horadets state farm,

, voted for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, which disproves his later statements about the alleged "decision made by Shushkevich and the BNF".

Financial compensation

In the 1990s, Belarus received aid from the United States for the elimination of nuclear weapons storage infrastructure and solving environmental problems (land reclamation, etc.), aid under the Nana-Lugar program, which manifested itself in the organization of relevant works.

The military departments of Belarus and the United States also adopted a program worth 120 million dollars.

Budapest memorandum

On December 5, 1994, in Budapest, the President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko signed the so-called Budapest Memorandum.

Its full name is "Memorandum on Security Guarantees in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

It was initiated by Ukraine, so only this state is indicated in the name.

December 5, 1994. Signing of the Budapest Memorandum, according to which the USA, Russia and Great Britain provided Belarus with security guarantees.

From left to right: Boris Yeltsin, Bill Clinton, Alexander Lukashenko, John Major

According to him, the USA, Great Britain and Russia undertook to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine, to refrain from threats or the use of force and economic pressure, to seek immediate action of the UN Security Council in order to provide assistance to Ukraine if it becomes a victim of an act of aggression or threat of aggression with the use of nuclear weapons.

The same obligations were extended to Belarus and Kazakhstan.

In 2014, Ukraine claimed that the Russian Federation had violated the Budapest Memorandum by annexing Crimea and committing aggression in the Donbass.

The last warhead was removed a day before the referendum

On November 27, 1996, the symbolic withdrawal of the "Topal" system from Belarus to Russia took place.

However, in reality, the last warhead left the territory of Belarus earlier, namely on November 23, a day before Lukashenko's referendum on changing the Constitution, which the democratic West, unlike Russia, did not recognize.