29 relatives of Belarusian political prisoners issued a joint appeal to Belarusian and foreign politicians, in which they called for more decisive efforts to release political prisoners in Belarus.



This letter is the beginning of an important social and political discussion, a new stage of understanding the situation in which the country found itself.

Briefly

  • The letter of the relatives of the political prisoners indicated an alternative approach to that of the democratic forces led by Tsikhanovskaya.

  • In exchange for the release of political prisoners, the West can offer only the easing of sanctions and recognition of the regime in one form or another.

  • Belarusian society should determine whether such a price is acceptable for it.

  • The non-inclusion of Belarus in the latest EU sanctions packages, made presumably at the request of Ukraine, shows that the West is based on its strategic interests in its relations with Lukashenka.

  • These interests do not contradict the interests of Belarusian society, but they do not coincide with them either.

How much do political prisoners cost?

It is worth paying attention to several key theses of the letter.

It notes that the exchange of political prisoners for some steps towards the regime is not an immoral act, an analogy is drawn with the exchange of prisoners between Ukraine and Russia.

If these exchanges are morally permissible, then hypothetical exchanges of Belarusian political prisoners for something are also.

And it really is.

There are many examples of such exchanges both in world and recent Belarusian history.

The warming of relations between official Minsk and the West in 2008 and 2015–2016 was accompanied by exactly such exchanges.

As a result, political prisoners were released.

The second important thesis of the letter is its main addressee: "We call on the leaders of the free world to take more decisive action in freeing political prisoners."

The main addressee is the West, not the democratic forces.

First, because the democratic forces, by and large, have nothing to offer in exchange for political prisoners;

secondly, because the most influential part of the democratic forces is rather critical and skeptical about the idea of ​​such an exchange.

The other day, Svetlana Tsikhanovskaya announced the priorities of the Demsyls for 2023: "The Demsyls plan to more intensively achieve the strengthening of sanctions against Lukashenka's regime.

Tsikhanovskaya insists on the further policy of non-recognition of Lukashenka."

So what could the West, even theoretically, bargain with

Lukashenka

's regime , what could it offer in exchange for the release of political prisoners?

Yes, only the reverse of what

Tsikhanovskaya

announced as priorities - weakening, softening, non-expansion of sanctions and some forms or at least gestures of recognition of the regime.

The few cases of release of political prisoners that have taken place since 2020 were the result of gestures of recognition, albeit indirect and conditional: in 2020, the then Secretary of State

Mike Pompeo

called Lukashenka - and

Vitaly Shklyarov

was released ;

last year Lukashenka was presented with credentials by the Swiss ambassador - and as a result Natalya Hershe was released.

Extrapolating from the experience of these two separate cases, the release of hundreds seems to require broader and clearer gestures of recognition of the regime.

What can sanctions?

Another way can be seen in the strengthening of sanctions, in the use of "whips" instead of "gingerbread".

But the sanctions, tough enough, have been in effect for quite some time.

So far, they have not led to the collapse of the regime, to its willingness to make concessions.

Again, it is worth recalling one's own historical experience.

The sanctions imposed after 2006 and 2010 were effective in the sense that they eventually made it possible to conclude an agreement with the regime, part of which was the release of political prisoners.

Experience shows that, in fact, in the sense of domestic politics, this is the only thing that can be exchanged for the lifting of sanctions.

So hasn't that moment come again?

It is actually a big political problem.

One can blame Tsikhanovskaya for not wanting the West to make too many concessions to Lukashenka for the release of political prisoners.

But it is strange to blame a politician for the fact that he comes from political motives.

Her political motives are not only her personal ones.

What part of the Belarusian society is ready for such an exchange, for a substantial lifting of sanctions and for recognition of the regime in one form or another, for "turning the page"?

It is necessary to realize that the price of the release of political prisoners is this.

And Tsikhanovskaya is not alone in not agreeing to pay such a price.

But isn't the key point of this Belarusian dispute - the fact that its solution only indirectly and partially depends on the Belarusian parties.

Only the West and the regime own the stakes in this hypothetical trade.

And the agreement between them will be concluded depending on the ratio of their interests.

And these interests do not coincide either with the interests of the democratic forces or with the interests of the relatives of political prisoners.

Not that they contradict, but they do not match.

What are the interests of the West and the regime?

Here is today's message - a leak from the sidelines of the European Union, that Belarus was not included in the latest sanctions packages at the request of Ukraine.

The motivation is clear - Ukraine does not want the Belarusian army to enter the war, and believes that it depends to a certain extent on Lukashenka.

Mo is wrong, but EZ took her worries into account.

And now the chairman of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announces that Belarus will be included in the next package of sanctions.

Why?

Because the interests of the European Union, the set of factors that it takes into account, turned out like this, differently than when the previous packages were adopted.

And I suspect that the appeals of the relatives of the political prisoners - the authors of the letter, as well as the position of Tsikhanovskaya, had a minimal impact on these decisions.

On the other hand, it is absolutely not clear that the regime is ready for any agreement with the West.

In 2008 and 2015-2016, he was interested in improving relations with the West.

Now, both the desire to expand repression and the course towards autocracy are being demonstrated.

No security considerations require Nobel laureate

Ales Bialiatski

to sit in a cage in handcuffs at court.

He wouldn't have outwitted the guards if he was sitting without handcuffs.

And the media of the whole world print these photos of the laureate in handcuffs.

And counting on that - yes, that's how toxic we are, that's how we are Mordor, such monsters.

Well, the recent laws on the confiscation of property of foreign companies and the actual abolition of the institution of intellectual property for "unfriendly" states are a direct path to self-isolation, to autarky.

In other words, it seems that the proposal "crawl on your knees" is a formula for "reconciliation" not only with political refugees, but also with the West.

For the vast majority of refugees, it is unacceptable;

even more so for the West.

Based on his interests, he is ready to make certain concessions in the form of a pause in new sanctions.

It's unlikely, even if Tsikhanovskaya urges him to do more.

What is the interest of Belarusian society?

But theoretically the conditions can change.

The interests of the West and the regime may turn out to be compatible, as it was during the remembered periods of improved relations.

At the same time, it seems that if this will happen, it will be due to the military situation, and not based on the situation of Belarusian political prisoners.

The release of political prisoners may be a side effect of the agreement on issues of war and peace.

And, as it seems to me, democratic forces should not put sticks in the wheels of this process.

The letter of relatives of political prisoners is the beginning of a public discussion on the topic of what is the interest of Belarusian society in this hypothetical agreement.

Previously, similar thoughts were expressed partly by individual experts.

Now this is the position of a certain, if not political, then social force.

And here the question is not that someone is right in this dispute, and someone is not.

But it is precisely in this discussion that it will be revealed what the current Belarusian national interest is in this matter.

The opinions expressed in the blogs represent the views of the authors themselves and do not necessarily reflect the position of the editors.

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  • Yuri Drakakhrust

    Radio Svaboda journalist


    drakakhrusty@rferl.org

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