On Tuesday, the American research center Atlantic Council held a discussion "How can Ukraine prevent the winter deadlock?".

Its participants discussed which factors depend most on the further progress of the war in Ukraine.

The discussion was attended by

Ben Godges,

former commander of US forces in Europe,

Melinda Goering,

deputy director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council,

Andriy Zahorodniuk,

former Minister of Defense of Ukraine, and

Ivana Klympush-Tsintsadze,

chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Commission of Ukraine on issues of integration with the European Union.

We bring to your attention the main thoughts of the participants.

Ben Godges, file photo

Ben Godges

, former commander of US forces in Europe, adviser to the international human rights organization Human Rights First:

  • The Ukrainians continue to inflict heavy losses on the Russian troops who are trying to advance on Bakhmut.

    Bakhmut has no obvious military significance.

    It seems that for the Russians - especially for [the head of the private military company Wagner] Prigozhin - this has become a personal challenge.

    He wants to show that his powers are the most effective.

    Unfortunately, thousands of people will die as a result.

  • I take seriously the warnings of the commander of the Ukrainian troops, General Zaluzhnyi, and the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Reznikov, that the Russians are planning to launch a new offensive from the north, possibly from Belarus.

  • The goal of such an operation could be an attack on Kyiv, or at least an attempt to stretch the forces of the Ukrainians and force them to divert resources from the main direction, which, in my opinion, is Melitopol and Crimea.

  • I'm a little skeptical about the ability of the Russians to concentrate the large forces required for such an operation and provide them with all the necessary supplies, but it is a serious threat.

    Probably, such an offensive can take place in the spring, if the Ukrainians fail to achieve significant success in the south and force the Russians to concentrate all their forces there.

  • I do not yet know to what extent Belarus is ready to participate in this... Ukraine has good intelligence, and the United States, Britain and other allies can provide additional information to get a clear picture of what is happening in Belarus.

    We will have a good understanding of what forces are being built up there, what are the logistics of military supplies.

  • I fully share the idea of ​​conducting extraordinary NATO military exercises in Lithuania and Poland in order to give Lukashenka an excuse before the Russians not to involve Belarusian troops in military actions against Ukraine.

    He will be able to say that NATO exercises are taking place on the western flank and it is necessary to react to it.

  • If the Ukrainians now had longer-range tactical missile systems, they could strike any Russian headquarters, transport hubs and ammunition depots in Crimea.

    This would make Crimea indefensible for Russian forces.

  • The Ukrainian General Staff did an excellent job, methodically destroying logistics networks, transport hubs and command posts of the Russians.

    If such strikes could be carried out at a greater distance, it would reduce the ability of the Russians to fire missiles at Ukrainian cities.

  • The delivery of the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system will be a big step forward.

    But with its help, if you integrate it into a wider air defense system, you can protect only one city.

  • It is important that the US administration openly declare: "We want Ukraine to win."

    In 10 months of war, they did not do it.

  • Our biggest problem is that too many people in the administration, including the Department of Defense—good people who want Ukraine to succeed—are not convinced that Ukraine will be able to force the Russians to leave Crimea.

    These people are afraid that there will be an escalation and that Russia will use nuclear weapons.

  • There are only two ways to Crimea - the Kerch bridge and the land isthmus, which is already under attack.

    The Ukrainians can strike in both of these ways and over time make Crimea indefensible for the Russians.

  • If we do not help Ukraine regain control over Crimea, the next phase of this conflict is guaranteed to begin in 4-5 years.

  • I predict that Ukraine will regain Crimea by the end of next summer.

Melinda Gehring, file photo

Melinda Gehring,

Deputy Director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council:

  • Support for Ukraine in the US is unwavering, especially in Congress.

    Concerns were expressed that the Republicans would want to soften their position regarding Russia.

    This will not happen - the Republicans will support the supply of weapons to Ukraine.

  • But I am concerned about what the budget support will be next year - the money that the USA gives to support the Ukrainian state: to support schools, the pension system, hospitals.

    It seems to me that the Biden administration did not explain well the essence of such budgetary support, and there will be pressure to reduce it.

  • Many in the West do not believe that Ukraine can regain Crimea without starting a nuclear war.

    We are afraid of Russia.

    It seems to me that the president and his national security adviser have convinced themselves that Russia is much more dangerous than it actually is.

  • US representatives stated that Ukraine itself will determine what constitutes a victory in the current war.

    We know that Paris and Berlin definitely do not share this opinion, but in the US administration it is more at the level of rhetoric.

Andrei Zagoradniuk, archival photo

Andrey Zahorodniuk,

former Minister of Defense of Ukraine:

  • The Russians will certainly try to organize a new offensive with the participation of the mobilized, after they receive training in a couple of months.

  • All sections of the border with Russia and Belarus are at risk.

    We must constantly maintain the presence of troops near the border.

    We track the movements of Russian troops, and we are sure that we will not miss a potential offensive.

  • When the Russian commander Suravikin withdrew his troops from Kherson, he clearly promised Putin some success in return.

    And it is most likely that this success should have been in Donbass.

    The situation in Donbass is now very difficult, but the Russians are not able to achieve their operational goals.

  • If we receive the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system from the USA in the foreseeable future, it will be a historic event.

    But there are other types of anti-aircraft weapons that are relatively inexpensive and advanced, and we cannot get them yet.

    We understand that the supply of more expensive or offensive weapons can be politically problematic, but this is not the case.

    And here we would like more clarity.

  • The Russians now store much of their strategic stockpile more than 100 kilometers from the front line.

    It is there that the main warehouses and logistics centers are located.

    If we had a critical mass of weapons capable of striking at such a distance, it would greatly improve the chances of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

  • If we got such weapons, there would be a period when the Russians would suffer heavy losses.

    It would likely destroy their offensive plans.

    After a couple of months they would adapt and move everything further away from the front line, but then it would be very difficult for them to get supplies to the front line, especially in the winter and spring.

  • The Russians are extremely poorly able to conduct operations in several directions at once, because their decision-making process is still super-centralized.

    This means that if we launched a counteroffensive in two directions, the Russians would probably lose on both.

    But we do not have enough weapons and ammunition for this.

  • The only thing stopping the Russians is their physical inability to do anything.

    If they are capable of doing something, they will do it.

  • We are building up military power painfully slowly.

    We would like to speed it up and be in greater coordination with our partners.

  • As long as Russia keeps Crimea, it will threaten the entire region.

Ivana Klympush-Tsintsadze, archival photo

Ivana Klympush-Tsintsadze,

Chairman of the Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Integration with the European Union:

  • Unfortunately, the Russians managed to destroy about 50 percent of the capacity of Ukrainian power grids.

    This could potentially lead to a humanitarian disaster.

  • A coordinated effort is needed to rebuild Ukraine's energy infrastructure, but beyond that, Ukraine needs more air and missile defenses to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure.

    And in order to liberate Ukrainian territories, we need other additional weapons.

  • There is already agreement in the West that Ukraine cannot be allowed to lose this war.

    But there is no consensus that Ukraine should win and what such a victory should be.

    This creates obstacles to the supply of weapons.

  • Russian intentions in this war have not changed.

    Russia is not ready for any meaningful negotiations that could lead to sustainable peace.

    They would like some kind of negotiations or truces to take a breather, regroup and attack again.

  • When it is said that peace talks are necessary to avoid a world war, what is actually meant is how to give Russia the opportunity to rest, draw conclusions from the current war, and then start a world war.

  • Now we see many holes in the sanctions against Russia and even attempts to relax European sanctions against some Russian companies.

    The policy of sanctions requires greater sincerity and control.