What was the real purpose of Putin's visit to Minsk?

Can they start killing Ukrainians with weapons made in Belarus?

And how long will the economy of Russia and Belarus be able to exist under the conditions of sanctions?

Russian economist, director of the Center for Post-Industrial Society Research Professor Vladislav Inozemtsev thinks about this and other things.

Briefly

  • It is obvious that the idea of ​​a new campaign on Kyiv from the territory of Belarus remains relevant.

    I think Putin will definitely try to do it again.

  • Lukashenko will not send his army to Ukraine, he perfectly understands that his personal power, his safety and his life are at stake.

  • Now many experts in Russia and in the West are discussing the issue of the transition of Russian industry to military rails.

    I think it is basically impossible.

    The maximum that can be achieved is an increase in production volumes at those plants that already exist.

  • Sanctions were introduced to change Putin's policy towards Ukraine and stop the war.

    But I think that Russian politics will not notice the sanctions, because Putin will continue them regardless of the state of the economy.

  • It is interesting for Russia to place its military orders in Belarus, and perhaps repurposing some Belarusian enterprises to fulfill Russia's defense order is very desirable, and I think that such cooperation is quite possible.

  • The military defense complexes of Russia and Belarus are condemned to work together in the current conditions.

  • The defeat in Ukraine, in my opinion, at the current stage, by and large, will not be noticed in Russia.

  • If this war goes on for another year or two, then society will be much more tired and much angrier, and the economy will be in much worse shape.

    And then internal problems are possible.

  • My horizon from today is about two years for the regime to have serious problems.

  • The issue of regime change in Russia will be decided after Putin.

    I believe that the Moscow regime cannot exist under another leader.

    This means that the physical departure of Putin also means the end of this regime.

  • Minsk's regime is even more stable than Moscow's.

    Lukashenka has been ruling longer than Putin, he actually made the same changes before Putin that Russia made later.

  • Belarus has something that Russia does not have - it is the "big brother" effect.

    If serious financial or political problems begin in Russia, there is no one to turn to for help.

    And in the case of Belarus, you can count on Russia.

    As long as Putin exists there, Lukashenka can always count on his help.

"Lukashenko will not send his troops to Ukraine"

- Putin's visit to Minsk took place.

Statements made at the final press conference.

What can be said about the real purpose of the negotiations?

Were they military visits, military-industrial visits, or both?

- All together, of course.

I think that Putin still has intentions to involve Belarus in a full-scale war.

Although, from the point of view of international law, what Lukashenka did starting from February 2022 is as much aggression against Ukraine as the actions of the Russian Federation.

After all, participation in aggression consists in presenting one's territory for the passage of troops of a third party.

And there were even missile attacks on Ukraine from the territory of Belarus, Russian planes took off and are taking off from there, shelling Ukraine and launching missiles at Ukrainian cities.

Vladislav Inozemtsev

In this sense, Lukashenka is definitely an aggressor for any international legal assessment.

But Putin, of course, would like Lukashenka to send the Belarusian armed forces to Ukraine.

It is obvious that the idea of ​​a new campaign on Kyiv from the territory of Belarus remains relevant.

I think Putin will definitely try to do it again.

Ukrainian intelligence has been talking about this since August.

On the other hand, I believe that Lukashenka is unlikely to break down.

It would be an extremely dangerous step for him.

And not from the point of view of how his actions will be perceived by the West, but because, as I suspect, the Belarusian army does not want to fight, and the relations between Belarusians and Ukrainians are not hostile at all, the Belarusians did not have any complaints against the Ukrainians and do not have any.

And if Lukashenka tries to send his fellow citizens to die in this war, then, of course, the loyalty of the army can change very quickly.

Lukashenka perfectly understands that his personal power, his safety and his life are at stake.

Therefore, I think that the Belarusian army will not cross the border with Ukraine.

Although, I repeat, Russian troops from Belarusian territory may once again try to attack.

"Belarus will produce means of killing Ukrainians"

- At the press conference following the negotiations, Putin spoke about the establishment of industrial cooperation, the joint production of new military equipment and the exchange of goods.

Can the industrial potential of Belarus really help Russia in times of war?

Does this mean that Ukrainians will be killed with military equipment produced in Belarus?

- Absolutely, they can.

Russian industry to this day, and according to the state before the war, was at the limit of what it could produce.

Now many experts both in Russia and in the West are discussing the issue of the transition of Russian industry to military rails.

I think it is basically impossible.

The maximum that can be achieved is an increase in production volumes at the same factories that already exist.

Moreover, the increase is very limited, it depends, among other things, on monopoly, because there are many manufacturers of this or that equipment in the person of one company, and there is no competition in this market.

And the production of components at factories is very limited.

In addition, there are very few specialists in the military industry.

Mr. Barysau, the former Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Military Industry, said recently that the Military Industry lacks 400,000 people.

If this is so, then, in fact, every fifth job is vacant.

Therefore, the idea to load those enterprises in three shifts is simply impossible.

Therefore, it is natural that it is interesting for Russia to place its military orders in Belarus.

And, maybe, even to repurpose some Belarusian enterprises to fulfill Russia's defense order.

Given the closeness of the leaders of both countries, I think that such cooperation is quite possible.

Unlike placing such orders in other countries.

Lukashenka has nothing to lose, the sanctions against Belarus and Russia are approximately the same.

So I think it is quite possible.

And taking into account that the industrial potential in Belarus is quite high, especially in industries close to the wax industry.

For example, the Minsk Tractor Plant can be used for the repair of military equipment and even its assembly.

So Belarus' opportunities in this sense are even greater than Russia's.

Usually, I give the following example: since 2019, 39,000 tractors have been produced in Belarus, and 8,000 in Russia.

So the preserved industrial potential of Belarus can be used for military purposes.

So I assume that most likely - yes, this issue is resolved, and Belarus will produce Russian military equipment and will supply Russia with its own in exchange for another loan.

- It is known that Belarus has a developed electronic industry, and optics were previously supplied even to NATO countries.

- Yes, this is, strictly speaking, what Russia lacks.

Because, you see, the problem is that even in the absence of cooperation with NATO countries and Western powers, which existed before the start of the war, the Russian industry now produces a large amount of military equipment, which may not meet NATO standards, but is fully functional, let's say so. , and is used in combat.

And mostly, this technique is produced according to Soviet technologies and on the local market.

Therefore, I think that Belarus has enough opportunities to join the production of such products.

I believe that the military and defense complexes of Russia and Belarus are doomed to work together in the current conditions.

"Russia has the money to last another two years in the conditions of war and sanctions"

- You have repeatedly expressed your point of view on international sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia and Belarus due to aggression against Ukraine.

In your opinion, the sanctions are late.

For example, you believe that the Russian economy has reserves until the end of 2024, and until then the sanctions will not be very noticeable or catastrophic for it.

Accordingly, we can conclude that Russia will also have money to help Belarus.

What does the outlook for both economies look like under sanctions?

- Well, look.

I cannot say that the Russian economy will not notice the sanctions.

She notices them now.

The problem is that the Russian economy is one thing, and Russian politics and geopolitics are completely different.

Therefore, I assume that the sanctions, as at least declared, were always introduced in order to change Putin's policy regarding Ukraine and force him to stop this war.

In this sense, I think that Russian policy and the Russian war against Ukraine will not notice these sanctions, because Putin will continue them regardless of the state of the economy.

And we must distinguish the state of the economy in terms of employment, wages, income levels, and the state of the budget, which, accordingly, provides funding for the war effort.

From the point of view of the budget situation, I am absolutely convinced that for at least two more years Russia can fully exist in this mode, even despite the reduction of budget revenues next year and despite the further increase of military expenses.

Russia can cover the deficit at the expense of, firstly, the reserve fund (or the National Welfare Fund), which now has about 7 trillion rubles.

This closes any 2023 deficit in any case.

In addition, there is a lot of money on the Russian market that can be borrowed by the Ministry of Finance.

Russian national debt is one of the smallest in the world.

Plus, the population has a lot of money in banks, approximately 37 trillion rubles, which is one and a half of the state budget.

Naturally, the government can borrow this money.

Can borrow from other bank assets.

In the end, it can be quite easy to carry out a limited issue - that is, sell government bonds to banks, the banks will pledge them to the Central Bank and receive the corresponding funds.

In this case, I am absolutely convinced that attracting from various sources about 20 trillion rubles in two years is not a problem for Russia.

"The Moscow regime will disappear only after Putin's departure"

- How do you see the end of the Moscow and Minsk regimes?

Will it be military, economic or political reasons and factors?

Or all together?

Or will the regimes be able to exist for a very long time, and only the names of the leaders will change?

- I have been taking a very simple position for a long time.

I believe that the Moscow regime cannot exist under another leader.

This means that the physical departure of Putin also means the end of this regime.

This means chaos, the struggle of all against all, a large number of internal conflicts, as a result of which not only the figure at the head of the state will change, but also the political course, and the management system, and the system of checks and balances, and much more will fundamentally change.

In this case, it is a personalistic regime, which is confined to one person.

Putin had the opportunity in 2011 to give Medvedev the opportunity to go for a second term, to go into the shadows.

After six years, a new person would appear, and then this system would go into the style of such a Chinese system, where the superiority of one party is preserved, but the personalities of the leaders change.

But Putin did not go for it.

Accordingly, he chose the perspective of the collapse of the regime, but his own well-being.

This means that his prospects are guaranteed, but so are serious disturbances and, apparently, the collapse of the regime after his departure.

Therefore, I think that most likely the issue of regime change in Russia will be resolved after Putin.

The defeat in Ukraine, in my opinion, at the current stage, by and large, will not be noticed in Russia.

But if this war goes on for another year or two, then, of course, society will be much more tired and much more angry, and the economy will be in much worse shape.

And then internal problems are possible.

But then (I'll say it again), my horizon from today is about two years for the regime to have serious problems.

"The Minsk regime is even more stable than Moscow's"

- What can you say about the Minsk regime?

- The Minsk regime is, in fact, even more stable than the Moscow one.

In terms of the fact that Lukashenka has been ruling longer than Putin, he actually made the same changes before Putin that Russia made later - starting with the restoration of Soviet symbols and ending with changes in the Constitution.

Dozens of such examples can be cited.

Back in 2015, I had a long article in the Vedomosti newspaper, where I named, I think, 18 examples of how Putin imitated Lukashenka.

And since then, apparently, there have been twice as many of them.

The regime in Belarus survived the events of 2020, which means that it again, before Russia, went through a serious suppression of the opposition, through the emigration of a large number of people, pushed a large number of the active population abroad and survived.

And besides, Belarus has something that Russia does not have - it is the "big brother" effect.

In the event that serious financial or political problems begin in Russia, there is no one to turn to for help.

No Xi Jinping will help him.

And in the case of Belarus, you can count on Russia's help.

As long as Putin exists there, Lukashenka can always count on his help.

  • Siarhei Ablameyka

    Radio Svaboda journalist

    ablameikos@rferl.org

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