Increasing Russian pressure on Belarus reduces Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's ability to avoid concessions to the Kremlin.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's long game to reassert power over Belarus is progressing separately from Putin's efforts to get Belarus to take a more active role in his invasion of Ukraine.

Lukashenko confirmed that Russia had given Belarus an unspecified number of S-400 air defense systems during his meeting with Putin in Minsk on December 19, confirming ISW's 2021 forecast that Russian-made S-400 systems would begin to work in Belarus.

All about the topic:

Russian invasion of Ukraine 8641

Lukashenko previously ruled out providing Russia with the S-400 systems operating in Belarus from 2020.

This is what the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) wrote in its next analysis.

It once again comments on Russia-Belarus relations in the context of the war in Ukraine. 

Lukashenko is likely delaying Putin's larger demands -- among them committing Belarusian forces to join the invasion of Ukraine -- by making smaller concessions that he has held back for years.

Russian military personnel are likely to operate the Belarus-based S-400 systems.

Russian personnel can operate the S-400 systems from the so-called joint training center of the Russian-Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces in Grodno, Belarus with a permanent Russian military presence in Belarus, which the Kremlin established in spring 2021.

ISW continues to monitor indicators consistent with the most dangerous course of action for a renewed Russian invasion of northern Ukraine from Belarus.

Ukrainian military continues to warn of growing Russian threat from Belarus.

The commander of Ukraine's joint forces, Sergei Naev, said on December 20 that Russian elements in Belarus have "currently sufficient military potential" to pose an unspecified threat to Ukraine and that these elements could carry out unspecified "tactical actions".

Naev's statement marked a reversal in Ukrainian officials' characterization of growing Russian forces in Belarus;

previous Ukrainian descriptions of Russian forces in Belarus did not attribute to them a tactically significant capacity.

Independent Belarusian sources continue to report increasing Russian mechanized forces in Belarus.

About 30 Russian T-80 tanks were reportedly deployed in Belarus around 20 December.

These indicators support the MDCOA forecast, but this course of action remains unlikely at this time.

A Russian invasion of northern Ukraine from Belarus is not very likely imminent.

Naev reiterated that Ukraine's defense is prepared to defend northern Ukraine.

The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that as of December 20, it had not observed Russian forces forming strike groups in Belarus.

ISW will continue to monitor the situation.

Is Volodymyr Zelensky going to Washington?

Another topic is the Ukrainian actions - the moves of the authorities and what is happening on the front. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's visit to Bakhmut on the 300th day of the war undermines the Kremlin's ongoing information operation to portray Russian President Putin as a military leader.

Zelensky made a surprise visit to Ukrainian troops serving on the tense Bakhmut Front on December 20 and presented awards.

ISW writes that from October 1 to December 20, the Russians, in continuous fighting, managed to occupy a territory of 192 square kilometers in the vicinity of Bakhmut.

In October, the Russians, according to ISW, occupied 100 square km, and from the beginning of November to December 20 - 92 square km.

"The extent of the Russian advance in the Bakhmut area over the past 50 days is roughly equal to their advance in October. Russian sources are likely to continue to falsely claim that Russian forces are capturing significant territory in the Bakhmut area," ISW wrote, arguing in absentia with the Russians, who write that the offensive near Bakhmut has accelerated.

Meanwhile, Putin held a high-level awards ceremony where he celebrated the Russian occupation and Kremlin officials, such as proxy leaders of the occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, Russian propagandist and RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan and Russian blogger Semyon Pegov among other state dignitaries. employees.

ISW previously assessed that Putin has stepped up his efforts to insulate himself and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from constant criticism by making public appearances related to various endeavors aimed at improving Russia's military efforts.

This award ceremony further demonstrates Putin's determination to portray himself as a military leader.

Putin is likely seeking to deflect blame for Russia's military failures in Ukraine with propaganda that paints him in a positive light, but also absolves him of responsibility for the war.

Putin's decision to reward members of his circle who were not even directly involved in the fighting, unlike Zelensky's visit near the front line in Bakhmut, has drawn some criticism among Russian nationalist voices.

A former commander of Russian fighters and a critical voice in the Russian information space, Igor Girkin, noted that Putin rewards "his heroes in the Kremlin" but not Russian and subordinate servicemen who participate in front-line battles.

Other bloggers speculated that the Kremlin made a secret political decision for a Russian ceasefire, allowing Zelensky to walk around Bakhmut.

Another blogger reiterated that Putin had not visited the occupied territories and said that Russian forces would not be able to effectively deliver a precision strike in time against Zelensky.

Zelensky's visit to Bakhmut boosted Putin's efforts to establish himself as wartime commander-in-chief and turned Putin's own information operation into an embarrassment even in parts of the pro-war Russian information space.

PMC Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin further undermined Putin's authority, possibly inadvertently, in the Russian media space by trying to strengthen his position amid Zelensky's visit to Bakhmut.

Prigozhin released a series of videos in which he claimed to have arrived at the front line near Bakhmut to talk to Zelensky about control of territories in the area.

Prigozhin's "proposals" for negotiations with Zelensky are neither serious nor authoritative, since he does not hold an official position in Russia.

However, Prigozhin continues to present himself as a prominent political and military figure in Russia.

Such farcical comments are likely a response to Zelensky's repeated offers to negotiate directly with Putin after Russia withdraws its forces from Ukraine.

Prigogine's appearance on the front line further weakens Putin's portrayal as a wartime leader, as Putin has not even visited the Russian-occupied territories, nor gone anywhere near the front line.

Social media users further revealed that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu did not actually visit the front lines on December 17 - as he claimed - by geolocating the videos,

Although Prigozhin did not directly criticize Putin for his inability to directly address Zelensky or arrive at the front lines, his and Zelensky's visits to the front line threaten to make Putin's portrayal of wartime commander-in-chief more humiliating than effective.

The Kremlin's efforts to improve the reputation of the Russian MoD may have prompted Prigogine to redouble his efforts to legalize Wagner in Russia.

Russian state media RT - possibly linked to Wagner - published a 10-minute report on Wagner describing Prigozhin's creation of the paramilitary organization as an attempt to support "Russian interests" and protect the "Russian world".

Such a move suggests that Prigozhin is trying to rid Wagner of the mercenary stigma and instead re-present the group as a legitimate military formation in Russia that supports Russian national interests.

RT also featured prominent Kremlin officials such as the chairman of the Just Russia - For Truth party Sergei Mirnonov, who criticized the Russian government for not taking the initiative to recognize the "heroism" of Wagner's troops in Ukraine or to provide of official status under Russian legislation.

Private military companies are illegal in Russia. 

The event shows that Putin is making an increasing effort to surround himself with military uniforms, possibly hoping to evoke memories of Joseph Stalin during World War II.

Issues surrounding mobilization continue to concern the ISW as well. 

A Kremlin official deflected questions about a Dec. 17 claim by an army recruitment officer from the Moscow region that Russian authorities would extend the term of service for conscript soldiers.

ISW reported on December 17 that the military commissar of the Moscow region, Col. Alexei Astakhov, claimed that Russian authorities would extend the period of service for conscripts from 12 months to 18 for spring 2023 conscripts and to two years for fall conscripts. 2023

ISW also previously reported that Russian Defense Ministry officials denied these claims.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov deflected a question about the claim on December 20, saying Shoigu was in the best position to respond to any rumors about a two-year extension of military service.

An independent Russian investigative organization, the Conflict Intelligence Team, extended an unconfirmed report that Russian forces had assembled a unit of mobilized personnel and prisoners.

The report states that the unit has deployed to an unspecified settlement in the direction of Liman on the front line, where it is currently awaiting orders from its command.

ISW cannot independently verify these claims, but if true, they would indicate that Russian forces are conducting a prisoner recruitment campaign similar to the one used by Wagner to recruit "cannon fodder".

The Wagner Group's troops continued to have extremely high mortality rates due to high rates of casualties and infectious diseases.

A forcibly mobilized Crimean, Volodymyr Saychuk, said his unit fought alongside Wagner's forces in the Donetsk region, noting that the number of Wagner personnel killed was three times the number wounded.

Saychuk said many Wagner servicemen also wear white and red bracelets, indicating they have HIV or hepatitis C.

ISW previously reported on October 25 that Wagner was also recruiting prisoners with serious infectious diseases.

The Kremlin is unlikely to announce an end to the mobilization, as it would demobilize servicemen currently operating on the front lines or training to enter combat at a later date.

A Russian source said the Russian military has not released volunteers from the Shaimuratov Battalion, even though their contracts expire in November.

The report states that the wives of these servicemen went to the local military prosecutor's office, where the assistant duty officer stated that there was a provision of the partial mobilization order, according to which the military contracts remained in force while the mobilization was in progress.

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Russia-Ukraine war