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The goals of Russian President Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Putin - Russian politician.

Born on October 7, 1952 in Leningrad, now St. Petersburg. Prez in Ukraine has not changed, according to assessments of Ukrainian officials and ISW, which are based on statements and actions of the Kremlin.

Putin continues to pursue maximalist goals in Ukraine, using multiple mechanisms designed to force Ukrainians to negotiate on Russia's terms and possibly make preemptive concessions highly favorable to Russia.

This goal underlies the Kremlin's various military, political, economic and diplomatic efforts over the past 10 months in Ukraine.

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This was commented by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its daily bulletin on the course of the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hana Malyar said on December 15 that Russia's ultimate goal is the complete conquest and control of Ukraine, and noted that recent Russian intelligence operations were aimed at forcing Ukraine to enter into negotiations with Russia.

The deputy chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Khromov, said Russia was seeking to force Ukraine to open talks to generate a strategic pause that would give Russian troops time to regroup and rebuild their forces.

Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valery Zaluzhny stressed that Russia was seeking to temporarily force Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire in order to gather renewed resources and prepare for renewed future offensive operations.

Putin is pursuing his ultimate goal of regaining control of Ukraine and securing major territorial concessions.

Russia's current offensives in the Donetsk region, especially around Bakhmut and in the area of ​​the city of Avdiyivka-Donetsk, and the ongoing campaign of massive missile strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure are intended to create realities on the ground that Russia will likely demand that Ukraine recognize as basis for Negotiations.

Russian troops have stepped up their efforts throughout Donetsk Oblast with released combat forces following the withdrawal from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and have consistently pursued territorial targets, albeit unsuccessfully.

ISW continues to assess that Putin has ordered Russian troops to complete the capture of all of Donetsk Oblast, and that ongoing Russian offensive efforts around Bakhmut, the city of Donetsk and in the western part of Donetsk Oblast are part of an effort to implement that order.

Ukrainian officials reiterated that the immediate focus of Russian efforts is securing territorial gains in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Putin likely hopes that these offensive operations will threaten Ukraine's ability to defend additional territory and inflict significant damage on Ukrainian combat power, so that Ukraine will have no choice but to negotiate a cease-fire, to back down on Russia's terms and ultimately to give Russian troops time to recover and resume new offensive operations in the future.

Russia's massive missile strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure are Putin's second military effort to force Ukraine to surrender or enter into negotiations on Putin's terms.

Over the past two months, Russian forces have used missiles and drones to systematically target civilian and energy infrastructure in a way that has generated a disproportionate psychological impact,

They failed to force Ukraine to negotiate or offer pre-emptive concessions, and Ukraine retained the initiative on the battlefield after its two consecutive counteroffensive operations in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions.

Putin may therefore set the stage for a third by preparing for a renewed offensive against Ukraine in the winter of 2023. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny has suggested that such an offensive could take place as early as January at worst and March at best. the good case.

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In addition, Zaluzhny noted that this new offensive could take the form of another mechanized attack on Kyiv from Belarusian territory.

As ISW previously reported, there are a series of observed indicators that suggest that Russian forces may indeed be preparing for a new offensive operation - including a re-consolidation of force compositions along the main axes of attack and the movement of heavy equipment to the front lines.

The winter 2023 timeline proposed by Ukrainian officials for such a potential offensive is consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment that winter will facilitate Ukrainian and Russian offensive operations and is consistent with the current planned timeline for the completion of efforts to generate Russian forces.

Putin announced the start of mobilization at the end of September 2022.

Putin said Russia sent 150,000 mobilized men out of an initial 300,000 mobilized recruits to Ukraine on Dec. 7 - about two months after the mobilization began - and that 150,000 mobilized men continue to train in Russia to prepare for deployment .

The remaining 150,000 mobilized men in training should be deployed to Ukraine around February to March 2023, if training and deployment rates remain the same and as Putin described.

Zaluzhny noted that Russia is currently preparing 200,000 troops for deployment, an expanded estimate that likely includes servicemen from the fall 2022 recruitment cycle training alongside the rest of the mobilized recruits.

The combination of ongoing training efforts for both mobilized recruits and the fall 2022 recruitment pool, along with indications that Russia is preparing for another wave of "partial" mobilization, indicate that Russia is trying to generate combat capability for a renewed offensive in the first months of 2023.

Russian forces may be setting the stage for an attack from Belarus, although ISW continues to assess a Russian invasion from Belarus is not currently imminent.

The Ukrainian General Staff's daily reports from December 1 to 15 state unequivocally that Ukrainian officials have not detected Russian forces in Belarus forming strike groups necessary to attack northern Ukraine.

There were no observable open-source indicators that Russian forces were forming strike groups in Belarus as of December 15.

It remains extremely unlikely that Belarusian forces would invade Ukraine without a Russian strike group.

Khromov said on December 15 that Russia most recently deployed one battalion's worth of tanks to the Obuz-Lesnovsky training ground in Brest and one battalion's worth of tanks to the Losivdo training ground in Vitebsk during the week of December 4-11.

A senior Ukrainian intelligence official said on October 24 that Russia has deployed around 3,200 personnel to Belarus.

These numbers alone are not enough to support an invasion of Ukraine, but they could indicate an effort to re-build large Russian forces in Belarus.

Ukrainian officials say Russian forces in Belarus have no concrete plans to return to Russia after completing their training.

Khromov said the Russian military had not given any instructions to the Russian trainees in Belarus about their future assignments or whether they would return to Russia, stay in Belarus or attack Ukraine.

Russian commanders may be keeping options open for a potential attack on Ukraine from Belarus in the winter of 2023.

Senior Ukrainian officials are increasingly warning that Russian forces may try to attack Kyiv.

Zaluzhny said that Russian forces may try to attack Ukraine from Belarus between January and March 2023, and he has no doubt that Russian forces will attack Kyiv again on December 15.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said on December 13 that Russia may be preparing for a large-scale offensive in January and February 2023.

Elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army - basically the most elite heavy formation of the Russian army that can form the core of a strike force - have reportedly been training in Belarus since 15 December.

Khromov said that elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army are being trained in Belarus.

All maneuver units of the 1st Guards Tank Army suffered heavy losses near Kharkiv, Sumy and the eastern part of Kyiv Oblast, calling into question its "elite" status and effective combat power even after reconstitution with mobilized reservists and/or conscripts.

It remains extremely unlikely that Russian forces will be able to capture Kyiv, even if Russian forces attack again from Belarus.

It is extremely unlikely that Russian forces will succeed in attacking northern Ukraine in the winter of 2023 than in February 2022. Russia's conventional forces are severely degraded and lack the combat power they had when Russia tried (and failed) full force effort to capture Kyiv in February 2022. Russian forces have failed to secure victory in Ukraine and have lost over 70,000 square kilometers of occupied territory since leaving Kyiv.

Russian forces in Bakhmut are currently advancing no more than 100-200 meters per day, having concentrated their main efforts there.

Russia has not established air superiority and has largely depleted its arsenal of precision-guided munitions.

Ukrainian forces, for their part, have prepared significant defenses in northern Ukraine and are better prepared to defend themselves now than in February 2022. The terrain near the Belarus-Ukraine border is not conducive to maneuver warfare and possible invasion routes from Belarus to Kyiv are moving through protected choke points in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, which Ukrainian forces already have experience defending.

The Russian officer corps continues to suffer losses in Ukraine.

Ukraine's General Staff reported that Russian forces are replenishing their operational-tactical command with retired officers and those released from the reserve due to heavy officer losses.

ISW has previously reported a shortage of officers in Russian forces due to losses on the Ukrainian front lines, far exceeding the cumulative losses of Russian forces in 10 years of Russian operations in Chechnya.

ISW believes that this practice will continue to further worsen the already poor command structures within the Russian forces.

Russian media reports that the authorities in St. Petersburg refuse to recognize the staff of the "Wagner" group as participants in the war in Ukraine.

The publications reported that the authorities in Smolny, St. Petersburg did not allow the burial of a member of the group "Wagner" in the Alley of Heroes of Beloostrovsky Cemetery, because he was not a serviceman of the Russian Armed Forces.

A Russian media source claimed that authorities in St. Petersburg proposed that the soldier be buried in the newly created Alley of Valor, which financier Yevgeny Prigozhin opposed by promising that the person would be buried in the Alley of Heroes.

ISW previously reported ongoing tensions between Prigogine and the authorities in St. Petersburg.


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Russian efforts to generate forces in the occupied territories of Ukraine continue to generate social tension.

The resistance group Council of Mothers and Wives has amplified the complaints of mothers in the Donetsk region who are calling on Russian occupation officials to take their sons back from the war.

The Council of Mothers and Wives shared a report stating that mobilization officials in the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) forced full-time students to sign a 6-month contract with the Russian military that expired on October 11, but the Russian military has extended the deadline.

contracts until the end of the "Special Military Operation".

The report by the Council of Mothers and Wives states that the mothers of these students are appealing to the Russian government to bring their sons back from the front to allow them to study at university.

ISW previously reported on November 13 that Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Putin - Russian politician.

Born October 7, 1952 in Leningrad, now St. Petersburg. Prez ordered the demobilization of mobilized students in the Russian-occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

The Russian State Duma held the first reading of a law that would remove criminal liability for crimes in occupied territories if they were committed in the interests of the Russian Federation.

A Russian source said this bill targets the "new territories" of Russia, the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.

The Ukrainian Military Center expanded the second paragraph of the bill, which states that Russian occupation officials are allowed to refuse to punish illegal acts committed by Russian forces throughout the period of occupation and in the future on the grounds that such acts were committed in the interests of Russia and suggested that this could extend to refusing to punish war crimes.

Independent Russian publisher Meduza reported that the proposed legislation deliberately did not establish a deadline for waiving criminal prosecution in the occupied territories.

ISW previously assessed that this law would allow the Russian authorities to strengthen the integration of the judicial systems of the occupied territories into the Russian criminal justice system in a way that would give Russian law wider discretion in determining and adjudicating this , which represents legality in the occupied territories.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that a leader of the former occupation administration of Izyum admitted that Russian occupation officials used Ukrainian passports to falsify the results of the annexation referendum.

The SBU reported that the former head of the Savin Territorial Department of the Izyum Military-Civil Administration stated that her administration collected passport data from local residents during the Russian occupation and passed this information on to Russian occupation officials.

The SBU reported that the Russian occupation administration used the personal passport data of local Ukrainians to falsify the results of the referendum.

ISW previously assessed on December 14 that Russian occupation officials continued to pressure Ukrainian citizens to apply for Russian passports in an attempt to correct the apparent discrepancy between Russian claims of 99% public support for the annexation and a clear, demonstrated lack of Ukrainian interest.

On December 13, Ukrainian partisans sabotaged a transformer substation in Berdyansk, Zaporozhye Region.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian saboteurs blew up the transformer substation and its supporting power lines that supported the Khosa microdistrict, where Russian forces quartered mobilized forces.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the sophistication of this attack indicated that it was carried out by personnel with military experience.

Berdyansk occupation leader Alexander Saulenko said the attack left 10,000 people without power.

ISW assessed that the Russian occupation forces have not been able to neutralize the organized guerrilla movement in Ukraine and are unlikely to be able to do so in the future.

Russian occupation forces continued to forcibly relocate and detain Ukrainian civilians in the occupied territories on 15 December.

Kherson's occupation chief, Vladimir Saldo, said Russian occupation officials were having difficulty accommodating Ukrainians they had moved from the west bank and the 15-kilometer zone on the east bank of the Dnieper River.

Saldo said the authorities have housed Ukrainian civilians in temporary accommodation centers that are not suitable for winter use.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces forcibly relocated 40 Ukrainian children from Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, to Stavropol Krai, Russia under the pretext of "rehabilitation."

ISW has consistently reported on the deportation tactics of Russian officials and assesses that the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia constitutes a possible violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian forces have increased detentions of Ukrainian civilians in the occupied territories for reasons as simple as not having a Russian passport or using Ukrainian phone apps.

The Russian occupation forces increased economic integration in the occupied territories in Ukraine.

Russian media reported on December 15 that Russian President Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Putin - Russian politician.

Born on October 7, 1952 in Leningrad, now St. Petersburg, Prez has said that the annexed territories will reach Russian standards of living by 2030 and that pensions, capital investment and social standards will increase accordingly.

The head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin, said that Putin proposed to provide mortgages for new construction in the occupied territories at preferential prices.

Kherson occupation chief Vladimir Saldo said Putin instructed Kherson occupation officials to build a small Russian town on the Arabat spit, Khenichesk district, with buildings for Russian federal and local authorities and social institutions such as kindergartens, stadiums and shops.

Saldo claims that the design process of this Russian city is already underway and will soon rival the reconstruction of Mariupol in terms of construction speed.

The Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, Andryushchenko, also reported that the Russian occupation authorities were renaming the streets of Mariupol back to their Soviet names.

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Vladimir Putin

Russia-Ukraine war