Rumen Radev vetoed the changes to the Electoral Code - Politics

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The head of state Rumen Radev

Rumen Georgiev Radev is a Bulgarian military man, major general from the reserve.

A former commander signed a decree returning for a new discussion provisions from the Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Election Code (Election Code Law), adopted by the 48th National Assembly on December 2, 2022.

This was announced by the press office of the Presidency.

The following is the full text of the reasons:

"MOTIVES

To return for a new discussion in the National Assembly provisions of the Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Electoral Code, adopted by the 48th National Assembly on December 2, 2022.

Dear People's Representatives,

Effective control exercised by citizens through elections requires trust in electoral rules.

Only then would the necessary legitimacy of the elected institutions be achieved.

Parliament's right to change electoral rules is a form of rediscovering this much-needed trust, but not when done without public consultation, risking backfire.

I note that the parliamentary majority abandoned some of the hastily proposed amendments that initially changed the Bulgarian electoral process.

Rules were adopted to strike a better balance between ensuring the secrecy of the vote and overcoming controlled voting by replacing voting booths with voting screens.

The legislator guarantees a certain minimum remuneration of the members of the sectional election commissions for the responsible and professional work, which cannot be less than a quarter of the minimum wage.

Regarding some of the adopted changes, which refer to the way of voting and reporting of the election results, however, I exercise my right motivated to return for a new discussion provisions from the Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Election Code (ZID IC),

1. According to Art.

42, para.

2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the organization and order of holding elections shall be determined by law.

The legislator is given free discretion regarding the appropriate voting rules, but such legislation should be consistent with the principles established in Art.

10 of the Constitution.

Universal, equal and direct suffrage with secret ballot is the main means of realizing democratic governance - "through its exercise, the most important structures of state power are constituted and political control over their activities is carried out" (Decision No. 3 of 2017. of the Constitutional Court under Code of Criminal Procedure No. 11/2016 and Decision No. 9 of 2021 of the Constitutional Court under Code of Criminal Procedure No. 9/2021).

In this broad general context, the manner of voting is a matter of legislative expediency,

which itself is not subject to constitutional review.

However, does a law comply with the principles of electoral law established in Art.

10 of the Constitution, and in particular whether it ensures equal treatment of all votes, when it allows different ways of their submission in parallel without criteria, is part of the assessment of its compliance with the Constitution.

The adopted ZID IC leaves in most of the sections the voter at his discretion to determine the way of voting - by paper or by machine, instead of the law imperatively decreeing it according to certain criteria.

The right and obligation to imperatively define the method of voting belongs to the legislator.

This is required above all from the regulation of public relations in the sphere of public law, which undoubtedly are electoral relations.

In the latest amendments to the Electoral Code, however, the legislator did not fulfill his authority to legally regulate electoral relations so that they are in accordance with the principles of the Basic Law.

The majority of the provisions relating to machine voting, and specifically § 7-10, § 12-14, § 21-35, § 37-42, § 44-53, do not meet the constitutional standards of equality and secrecy of the vote .

The question is why with the ZID IC the mixing of voting with paper or with a machine in a polling station was undertaken.

The answer is the desire for the voter to have a "right to choose" how to vote.

When the law provides for different treatment for the same right or obligation, it must be based on an objective criterion.

The absence of an objective criterion as a measure of justice, in practice, cancels the prohibition of arbitrariness, which is part of the principle of equality and a substantive legal component of the content of the rule of law (Decision No. 1 of 2005 of the Constitutional Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 8/2004 d.).

The constitutional principle of equality is not violated if the different treatment is based on a certain criterion and is met by all of a group of subjects (Decision No. 4 of 2014 of the Constitutional Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 12/2013 and Decision No. 6 from 2010 of the Constitutional Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 16/2009).

However, the adopted ZID IC allows voting by preference with a paper ballot or with a machine voting ballot and creates a prerequisite for unequal treatment, without the legislator having created a criterion that all voters in the section must meet.

Contrary to the obligation established against him in Art.

10 of the Constitution, the legislator leaves it to the will of the voter that voting can be carried out in two different ways under the pretext that there should be "freedom of choice", but in practice the subjective preference of the voter is given importance.

Such "freedom of choice" cannot and should not replace the application of generally binding rules to which the electoral process, with its undoubtedly decisive significance for the democratic state, must be obeyed.

Freedom of choice refers to the formation and expression of the voters' will, and the method of voting should be regulated by imperative norms that guarantee the free expression of will and the basic principles of the Constitution.

It is for this reason that the Constitution does not regulate an obligation for the legislator to ensure freedom of choice, i.e.

each voter's preference with which type of ballot to cast his vote.

The method of casting the vote - by machine ballot, paper ballot or in another way - is not related to the constitutionally protected right to choose of the voters (Decision No. 9 of 2021 of the Constitutional Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 9/2021 d.).

It is for this reason that the Constitution does not regulate an obligation for the legislator to ensure freedom of choice, i.e.

each voter's preference with which type of ballot to cast his vote.

It is for this reason that the Constitution does not regulate an obligation for the legislator to ensure freedom of choice, i.e.

each voter's preference with which type of ballot to cast his vote.

The legislator is obliged to determine such a way of voting, which treats equally the voting by machine and by paper ballot and in all cases - while guaranteeing the secrecy of the vote.

By introducing, with § 7 of the adopted law, alternatively both methods of voting within the same section, the legislator does not act within the limits of legislative expediency, but creates conditions for the secrecy of the vote to be violated.

Depending on the number of voters who will vote one way or the other, their choice can be identified, which in itself leads to the mutual nullification of both alternative ways of voting and negates the meaning of elections as an instrument of democracy.

Moreover, the regulation in § 7, item 2 creates legal uncertainty, as it introduces an express restriction only for voters,

chose to vote with a "machine voting ballot", not to vote with a paper ballot.

By placing the ban at the time of preference for machine voting, the legislature deprives the voter of voting by paper if at the same time the machine breaks down.

There is no symmetrical prohibition against voters who preferred to vote by paper ballot not to vote by machine ballot.

This clearly shows the legislator's preference to guarantee voting by paper ballot and not to provide the same guarantees for machine voting, in violation of the principle of equality.

There is no symmetrical prohibition against voters who preferred to vote by paper ballot not to vote by machine ballot.

This clearly shows the legislator's preference to guarantee voting by paper ballot and not to provide the same guarantees for machine voting, in violation of the principle of equality.

There is no symmetrical prohibition against voters who preferred to vote by paper ballot not to vote by machine ballot.

This clearly shows the legislator's preference to guarantee voting by paper ballot and not to provide the same guarantees for machine voting, in violation of the principle of equality.

2. On the occasion of machine voting, the previous regulations in the Electoral Code have been checked for compliance with the Constitution with the conclusion that "it provides legal guarantees both for the universal, equal, direct and personal exercise of the right to vote, as well as for the voluntariness, authenticity of the will of the voter, the secrecy of the vote and the exercise of the right to vote only once in the same election and for the observance of the principles of publicity and transparency of the electoral process" (Decision No. 9 of 2021 of the Constitutional Court under Code No. 9/2021).

The machine voting arrangements prior to the amendments of 2 December 2022 provided both the necessary guarantees that the voter himself was able to verify the way the electronic system recorded his vote and the necessary guarantees against invalid voting.

The data on the number of invalid ballots over the years are indicative in this regard.

In the 2022 parliamentary election, there were 9,042 invalid ballots and in the April 2021 parliamentary election - 86,527. I am aware that the guarantees that the machine voting system still has in place are not absolute and cannot be decided by themselves. in itself all the problems of the electoral process accumulated over the years.

However, the removal of these guarantees would push voters away from the electoral process, instead of creating conditions and encouraging the exercise of the right to vote by all Bulgarian citizens.

which the still valid system of machine voting gives, are not absolute and cannot solve by themselves all the problems of the electoral process that have accumulated over the years.

However, the removal of these guarantees would push voters away from the electoral process, instead of creating conditions and encouraging the exercise of the right to vote by all Bulgarian citizens.

which the still valid system of machine voting gives, are not absolute and cannot solve by themselves all the problems of the electoral process that have accumulated over the years.

However, the removal of these guarantees would push voters away from the electoral process, instead of creating conditions and encouraging the exercise of the right to vote by all Bulgarian citizens.

3. The adopted ZID IC not only duplicates the method of voting without an objective criterion, but also replaces the characteristics of machine voting as a type of electronic voting carried out in a controlled environment.

This contradicts the purpose of voters having a "right to choose" between paper and machine, since in all cases the counting of machine voting results will be done not by the machine, but by counting by the sectional election commission of machine voting ballots (§ 24 and § 45), the protocol of machine voting (§ 30, 31, 39, 49) and the transfer of data from the recording technical device (§ 32, 50 and related § 33 and 51) are omitted.

The changes made erase the specific signs of machine voting and its arrangement no longer corresponds to its name and purpose as a type of electronic voting.

Such a discrepancy between formal regulation and meaningful purpose makes the regulation of machine voting incompatible with the principle of the rule of law, which requires unambiguous and clear legislation.

Machine voting is no longer an alternative to voting with a ballot, but is also voting with a ballot, which, however, is not printed by the printing house of the Bulgarian National Bank, but by the machine in the polling station.

Thus, the nature and meaning of machine voting is erased and the voter's "right to choose" how to vote is effectively eliminated.

which, however, was not printed by the printing house of the Bulgarian National Bank, but by the machine in the polling station.

Thus, the nature and meaning of machine voting is erased and the voter's "right to choose" how to vote is effectively eliminated.

which, however, was not printed by the printing house of the Bulgarian National Bank, but by the machine in the polling station.

Thus, the nature and meaning of machine voting is erased and the voter's "right to choose" how to vote is effectively eliminated.

4. The transparency and security of machine voting are important conditions for voter confidence in this voting method.

In an attempt to strengthen these elements, along with the substantial changes in the legal nature of machine voting, the legislator adopted the provisions of Art.

213b and Art.

213c (§ 12 and § 13 of the ZID IC).

§ 12 provides for the provision of access to the source code, the "system documentation for the electronic machine voting system" and all other software tools applicable to the electoral process.

Access is provided to persons nominated by the parties and coalitions that received more than 4 percent of the actual votes in the last parliamentary elections.

Each of the parties and coalitions can nominate no more than three persons.

I support the legislator's initiative to provide access to the source code and reduce suspicions of improper manipulation of voting machines.

However, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that outside of the last 10 days before election day, there is no time limit for access;

there is also a lack of regulation to frame the purpose of providing access, as well as the actions that can be performed with the code.

All this does not guarantee the security of machine voting.

The criterion chosen by the legislator for determining the entities that will be granted access to the source code, namely - the binding of the percentage of votes received, creates prerequisites for violating equality before the law.

If the purpose of providing the code is to check its functionalities, then the mentioned limiting criterion limits both the parties and coalitions that did not pass the electoral barrier in the previous parliamentary elections, as well as the initiative committees, to familiarize themselves with the code and form their reasoned judgment about the security guarantees of machine voting.

An objective criterion is needed to guarantee the equality of citizens before the law.

Paragraph 13 sets out the rules for providing the paper for printing ballots from machine voting.

These rules should be considered in the context of the important transformation carried out with the current ZID IC regarding the legal nature of the receipt.

From a document representing a statement of knowledge of facts with legal significance, assuring the voter that his vote was accurately counted, the receipt was transformed into a "machine ballot", i.e.

in a document materializing the voter's will.

Pursuant to § 21, which amends Art.

268 of the IC, the reflected vote will be written on the ballot printed by the machine, which will not by itself form the result of the machine voting.

According to § 24, the result of the machine vote will be reported by the sectional election commission by counting the ballots from the machine vote.

Ballots from machine voting will be sorted according to the same rules as paper ballots (§ 28), although they will not contain the same details as the paper ballot.

It is intended that the ballot paper printed by the machine will be stamped on the back with the seal of the commission, but the changes in § 27 do not provide the necessary guarantees that the vote will not be considered invalid if it does not contain two stamps of the relevant sectional election commission, as requires Art.

278, para.

3, item 3 of the IC.

The lack of precision of the adopted provisions on machine voting and their consistency with the existing provisions on ballots or paper ballots (what duplicate use of the terms will appear in the Electoral Code if the adopted changes give rise to legal effect) will lead to divergent application,

The reason why the Central Election Commission, in fulfillment of its obligation under Art.

213c, para.

1 of the IC (§ 13 of the ZID IC) must announce its decision to determine additional protections for the specialized paper that will be used to print the ballot paper from a machine vote, and publicize this decision after declaring the election day closed.

Obviously, this would compromise the ability to use such protections in future elections, dooming machine voting to uncertainty.

5. With § 6 of the ZID IC, the requirements for the members of sectional election commissions outside the country are changed.

If the law gives rise to its legal effect, in each sectional election commission abroad, the Central Election Commission shall appoint one civil servant or person working under an employment relationship in the state administration, proposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or by a deputy minister authorized by him.

It is no longer possible for the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Deputy Minister authorized by him to refer to proposals from organizations of Bulgarian citizens in the respective country.

In this way, the participation in the electoral process of the organizations of Bulgarian citizens abroad has been unreasonably narrowed.

6. I cannot ignore the fact that the parliament has finally canceled the prospect of experimental remote voting laid down in the Electoral Code.

With the transitional provision of § 54, the possibility of conducting experimental remote electronic voting disappears from the legal peace.

The need to update the regulatory conditions in order to implement remote electronic voting does not justify the legislator to cancel the basis for conducting such type of voting, even in an experimental form.

The point of the explicit legal possibility for experimental remote voting in an electronic environment is precisely to accumulate enough real experience for its positives and negatives - whether it would be secure enough for citizens, whether it would reduce invalid ballots and whether it could be an effective form of voting in general .

With the repeal of § 145 of the Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Electoral Code (Official SG No. 39 of 2016, last amended by SG No. 21 of 2019), the parliament lightly crossed out the significant efforts of the state to created conditions for the preparation and conduct of this type of vote, which is measurable in a significant financial and administrative resource.

What is more reprehensible, however, is that in practice such a legislative approach recognizes the palliative nature of all these actions over the years that have been reported in relation to experimental remote voting in an electronic environment.

I believe that the legislator should preserve the rules that have the potential to develop the possibility of remote voting, especially important for Bulgarian citizens who live abroad.

State Gazette no.

21 of 2019) the parliament lightly crosses out the considerable efforts of the state to create conditions for the preparation and conduct of such a vote, which is measurable in a significant financial and administrative resource.

I believe that the legislator should preserve the rules that have the potential to develop the possibility of remote voting, especially important for Bulgarian citizens who live abroad.

State Gazette no.

I believe that the legislator should preserve the rules that have the potential to develop the possibility of remote voting, especially important for Bulgarian citizens who live abroad.

Dear People's Representatives,

The stability of the legal system and consistent legal regulation are among the signs of the rule of law.

Legislative expediency can and should be exercised only within the constitutionally established limits, with which the adopted ZID IC is incompatible, as it does not guarantee the equality of voters before the law, the secrecy of their vote and the optimal organization of the electoral process abroad.

For the stated reasons, I exercise the right under Art.

101, para.

1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria to return for a new discussion the provisions of § 6, § 7-10, § 12-14, § 21-35, § 37-42, § 44-53 and § 54 of the Law on Amendments and Supplements of The Electoral Code adopted by the 48th National Assembly on December 2, 2022".

Rumen Radev

presidential veto

election code

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Rumen Radev vetoed the changes to the Electoral Code - Politics