Briefly:

• In Sochi, Putin said what Lukashenka wanted to say, and Lukashenka said what he wanted, but Putin could not say.

• Lukashenka had to confirm for his nomenclature that he was not "out of favor" with Putin.

• If the Kremlin ignored the political risks inside Russia during the mobilization, where are the guarantees that it will not ignore them in relation to Belarus?

• If it becomes clear that the first wave of mobilization in Russia did not solve anything, then the pressure on Belarus may increase very much.

• Previously, Lukashenka managed to deviate simply because no one demanded it from him.

- Traditionally, there are no official statements regarding the results of the meeting between Lukashenka and Putin in Sochi.

Against this background, even serious political scientists analyze "body language", how they sat, in what poses, and so on.

Nevertheless, what conclusions do you think can be made about the results of this meeting?

- I think it is possible to analyze not only the way they sat, but also what they said.

Putin said what Lukashenka wanted to say, and Lukashenka said what he wanted, but Putin could not say.

In order not to mislead each other, they voiced what the other side really wanted to say.

Putin said that he really wanted to meet Alexander Ryhorovich at the SCO summit in Samarkand, but his tight schedule did not allow it.

Therefore, I thank Lukashenka for agreeing to come to Sochi to talk with him.

Although in reality it is clear that it was Lukashenka who asked for the meeting.

And he was very scared and tensed when he failed to meet Putin in Samarkand.

Lukashenka had to confirm for his nomenclature that he was not in "disfavor" with Putin, that they still meet and discuss important matters.

And on the other hand, Lukashenka told how the pagan West disrespects such a great country as Russia.

In fact, Lukashenka's entire speech was about what Putin wanted to say.

That is, Putin allowed him to express what he himself had on his tongue.

And Lukashenko, having studied his colleague wonderfully for so many years, managed to voice what Putin really wanted to say, but it was inconvenient, "out of order" - to complain and cry.

That is why Lukashenka spoke all this instead of him.

- It turns out that there is such a harmonious symbiosis between them in this sense?

- In this sense, yes.

They are willing to cover for each other and know what to say to please each other and leave the other party satisfied.

- For the Belarusian society, the most important question is whether Lukashenka will be able to escape from the embrace of the Kremlin.

Will it still be possible to resist and not give the Belarusian army to participate directly in the war?

- I think there are many reasons to say that Russia can "keep an eye" on Belarusian human resources.

From the way the mobilization in Russia is going, we can see that it is simply recruiting people, that no one understands the quality of these people and the political consequences.

No one is concerned about their "morale", the degree of military readiness, medical training.

The Russian authorities are not particularly interested in all this, because they need to report how many people were put under the gun.

And if nobody cares about quality, why not add a few thousand Belarusians?

Moreover, they have a ready army.

Putin is increasingly focused on quantity, not quality.

Of course, the value of the Belarusian army is not too great, a lot was written about it, but these were rational opinions.

Now there are fewer of them, and the Kremlin wants to win with numbers.

And as it becomes clear that the first wave of mobilization in Russia did not solve anything in particular, the pressure on Belarus in this direction can grow very strongly.

- But if Russia is going to mobilize a million people, then why does it still need those 15 thousand Belarusian soldiers - the number that experts call combat-capable units?

All the more, the entry of the Belarusian army into the war can bring obvious political problems to Lukashenka, it is not known how the Belarusian conscripts will react, whether it will create a political crisis.

- We have made sure that the sensitivity to political risks has decreased very much recently.

Previously, the mobilization was not announced precisely because of political risks, because of possible mass dissatisfaction.

If the Russian authorities ignored these risks inside Russia, where are the guarantees that they will not ignore them in relation to Belarus?

About combat parts.

If this combat capability is completely ignored in Russia and the main task is to recruit any kind of people, then why would the Kremlin be interested in the combat capability of the Belarusian army?

The main thing for them is to gain manpower, and here the 60,000 Belarusian army can just close this task.

- You are talking about the interests of the Kremlin.

But there are also the interests of Lukashenka, who understands that mobilizing and sending Belarusians to war will be a disaster for him personally.

That is, they will no longer ask him?

Or he can no longer openly object, but will convince the Kremlin that neither you nor I need it and will only bring harm?

— Lukashenka understands that if the Kremlin is firmly determined, then it is pointless to object.

Therefore, if there is such a decision of the Kremlin that Belarus should take part in the war, Lukashenka will try to "make adjustments", in what quantity, in what form, to mitigate the consequences.

But I do not think that he has the opportunity to say a firm "no" to the Kremlin, to refuse completely.

But he can try to "make corrections", clarify in his own favor, so that it causes less indignation.

- On the sidelines of the UN, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, Vladimir Makei, met with various Western politicians and, as it is claimed, proved to them that "it is necessary to save Lukashenka from Russia."

Can Lukashenka now offer something to the West so that it changes its policy towards him?

- I don't see any signs that the West can somehow change its attitude towards Lukashenka.

There is an impression that Belarus is firmly chained to Russia and it is now impossible to detach it from there.

There is no willingness in the West to believe that Lukashenka is capable of distancing himself from Russia.

He can release the police prisoners, but, in addition to the values ​​of the West, we would like to see practical steps, at least a distancing from Russia in the war.

— So if Lukashenka does not receive help from the West, his support does not increase in Belarus, then he has no way to fight back from Russia, in your opinion?

Why did it work before?

- Previously, Lukashenka managed to do this simply because no one demanded it from him before.

The quality of management decisions in Russia is rapidly deteriorating, and it is increasingly difficult to use rational arguments.

I don't know when it will happen.

But taking into account the way the Russian mobilization is going, the arguments why the same should not be done with Belarus are gaining strength.

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SAFE

• Vitaly Tsygankov

  Vitaly Tsygankov graduated from the Faculty of Journalism of BSU.

  One of the two founders of the first non-governmental news agency BelaPAN.

  He worked in "Zvyazda" newspapers, was a correspondent in Belarus of the Russian "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", Associated Press, columnist in "Svaboda" newspaper.

  On Belarusian Freedom since 1994.

  Correspondent of Russian Freedom in Belarus.

  
  

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