These questions are answered by sociologist, head of the Belarusian Analytical Workshop, professor

Briefly

• The attitude of Belarusians to various aspects of the war in Ukraine, which began on February 24 last year, was formed almost immediately and has not changed since.

• During the year, there was an increase in the proportion of "Difficult to answer" answers to questions related to the war.

• Part of the society is confused under the influence of contradictory and opposite flows of information.

• From the very beginning of the war, the Belarusian society was very consolidated in its unwillingness to have the Belarusian army participate in hostilities.

• This is explained by the people's genetic memory of the many devastating wars that took place on Belarusian territory.

• Society is divided into two information cocoons - those whose slogan is "No to war" and those for whom "there is no war".

• Over time, the narratives of Belarusian propaganda change: at first, it very actively approved of Russian aggression;

  now switched to creating a positive image of Russia as such.

• The overwhelming majority of Belarusians do not believe that their country is participating in the war.

• Among the problems that concern Belarusians the most, war appeared for the first time.

• War as a problem for them is the risk of involving the Belarusian army in hostilities.

— How did the attitude of Belarusians to the war that began on February 24 change during 2022?

In the polls, you studied various aspects of this attitude - the relationship to the deployment of Russian troops in Belarus, to their use for attacks on Ukraine, to the positions of the parties (Russia and Ukraine), finally, to the desire for Belarus to participate in the war with its troops.

What was the dynamics of the responses?

- There were several waves of research.

The short answer to your question about dynamics: dynamics was essentially absent.

The first results were obtained in the March survey.

But even then, they basically remained the same.

And it is quite surprising that the attitude towards this or that phenomenon practically does not change.

Andrei Vardomatsky.

Archive photo

Fluctuations of indicators, if they do occur, are within the error of representativeness.

Certain notable changes occurred in the proportion of respondents who chose the "Difficult to answer" option.

This group increased from survey to survey.

In the question about the attitude to the presence of Russian troops in Belarus, 6.7% chose the option "Difficult to answer" in March, and 18.6% in September.

How can this be explained?

The first explanation is that the effect of social desirability is stronger.

The issue becomes more sensitive over time.

There is some "official general line", and the respondents would not like to answer this question for sure.

- Many people explain such effects as a factor of fear.

In Russia, a large number of people are brought to justice for anti-war statements, there are such cases in Belarus as well.

Perhaps people are simply afraid to answer honestly, because they are afraid that their opinion will become known to the authorities and they will be punished for the "wrong" position?

Or is it more of a socio-psychological phenomenon?

In the USA during the 2016 presidential election, many of those who voted for Trump did not admit their intention to do so during the polls.

No one in the United States would be imprisoned for such a vote, but admitting the intention to vote for Trump was not comilfo.

The increase in refusals to give a certain answer in Belarusian polls is a direct fear of consequences, or is this a reluctance to not be a comilfo?

- I would talk more about fear.

Although what you said is also true - reluctance to express an opinion that goes against the official one.

This is also the social desirability effect that these two components have.

But there are other explanations for this increase in the number of "Difficult to answer" responses.

As more and more conflicting information comes in, some people find it really difficult to respond, to articulate their position.

On the one hand, there is information from the Russian media with the narrative that this is a just war, that it is not against Ukraine, but against a bunch of bad guys who have seized power in Kiev and are running everything under the tutelage of the Americans.

Another message of this narrative is that "work" is done only with high-precision weapons.

On the other hand, information comes from Ukrainian sources, from Belarusian non-state media.

And some Belarusians were confused.

I have already said that there is essentially no dynamic of attitude.

But the increase in the share of those who do not give certain answers indicates that the dynamics may appear.

Those who choose "Difficult to answer" may take one or the other certain position in the future.

- How do the answers to various questions about the attitude to the current war between Russia and Ukraine differ?

- In response to a direct question: "Who do you support more in the conflict - Russia or Ukraine?"

advantage on the side of Ukraine.

But in the answers to the question about the causes of the war, we observe a "geopolitical vinaigrette".

There is no dominant in the answers.

About a quarter of Belarusians say that Russia is to blame, and this is the first position in the hierarchy.

But there is no clear dominance directly behind Russia as the culprits - the USA and NATO;

a certain part of the respondents places the blame on Ukraine.

It is noteworthy that a significant part of the respondents assigns the responsibility for the war to everyone - Russia, Ukraine, the West, and China.

It can be said that two infakocans, or two information poles, have been formed.

The slogan of one of them is "No to war", the slogan of the other is "No war".

The first pole is the position of the diaspora and informationally advanced Belarusians.

The second pole is those people who do not feel the presence of war, they have little information about what is happening.

- In your research, you asked people whether Belarus is participating in the war?

Everyone or many people know that Russian troops attacked Ukraine from the territory of Belarus, Russian missiles are flying from the territory of Belarus to Ukraine.

But more than 60% of the respondents answered that Belarus is not an accomplice in the military conflict.

These are not only supporters of Lukashenka.

Some of those who answer this way think that Belarus is occupied by Russia, that these attacks are a war between Putin and Lukashenka.

And Belarus has nothing to do with it.

Are those information cocoons that you said already divided?

- Key among the "military" indicators are the answers to the question "How do you feel about the possible entry of Belarusian troops into the territory of Ukraine to participate in military operations?".

And there are no two information cocoons in the answers to this question.

There is a clear consolidation here - more than 80% give a negative answer.

As for the answers to other questions (about the presence of Russian troops in Belarus, about their actions against Ukraine from the territory of Belarus), there is no such consolidation.

As for the question of whether Belarus is involved in a military conflict, the overwhelming majority of Belarusians give a negative answer.

And this is in sharp contrast to the answers given during the polls in Ukraine, where more than 80% believe that Belarus is an accomplice of aggression.

As for the consolidated negative attitude towards the participation of Belarus in the war by its troops, it was impressive both in terms of scale and the speed of its formation.

In 30 years of sociological research, I cannot recall more than 80% of respondents showing the same attitude about anything.

The fact that such an attitude was formed very quickly, I explain as follows: this is the instant work of the genetic memory of the people.

Many wars have passed through Belarusian lands in history, Belarus lost up to a third of its population in them.

And these many wars formed the mechanism of rejection of war.

And it worked instantly, in the first days after February 24, 2022.

- You said that many people do not notice the war, they are guided by the principle that there is no war.

And to what extent does the society as a whole perceive it as a problem, as a threat?

- Very high.

In the survey at the end of 2022, we asked what problems the respondents consider to be the most important for them.

And there are two problems at the top - the war and the low level of income.

And for the respondents, the problem is not the war in Ukraine per se, but the risk of involving Belarus in it.

In previous years, in similar polls that we conducted before the New Year, there was never such a situation where the most pressing issues were two, approximately equal in severity.

Economic problems usually dominated by a huge margin.

The war did not immediately enter the list of the most important, acute problems.

Mobilization in Russia was a significant push in this direction.

— Mobilization or bringing thousands of mobilized to Belarus for military training?

- Mobilization itself.

I spoke about the penetration of the Russian narrative into the Belarusian mass consciousness.

There were several stages in this process.

At the beginning, the war was presented intensively and equally in the Belarusian and Russian state media.

But at the current stage, the Belarusian mass media began to provide very little information about military actions.

The dominant position shifted to the promotion of a positive image of Russia.

It is interesting to note that there is no feeling of threat from Russia in the mass consciousness.

We recorded this back in the days of the Russian annexation of Crimea.

I called it "geopolitical romanticism" at the time.

He is present, and he has not changed.

And it is supported by the information of the Belarusian state media, which forms a positive image of Russia.

- According to the data of your last survey, the strongest emotion felt by Belarusians is hope.

For what?

For the victory of their own?

That this diabolical darkness will end?

That the Belarusians will not be involved in this?

- For all that you listed.

We asked the question "How do you feel about the coming year?" and there were options for answers: hope, concern, uncertainty.

Hope took the main position (51%), 30% - concern and the rest - uncertainty.

It is interesting that these numbers almost coincide with those at the end of 2021.

• Yuri Drakakhrust

  Journalist of Radio Svaboda

  
  

  drakakhrusty@rferl.org

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