The head of the Belarusian project of the British Chatham House , Ryhor Astapenia,

told about the results of the latest poll on the Svaboda Premium YouTube channel .

Briefly

  • The attitude of Belarusians to the Russian mobilization indicates a clear division according to views in the Belarusian society.

  • Belarusians in general know only about the most significant events.

    What the media does not talk about day and night, only a few people know.

  • When Belarusians move away from their political preferences, they perceive the war as a humanitarian disaster.

  • It cannot be said that the attitude of Belarusians towards Russia is noticeably deteriorating.

  • One of the factors of this stability of the attitude towards the Russian Federation is the role and weight of the Russian mass media in the media consumption of Belarusians.

  • Politicized Belarusians live in their informational "bubbles", their informational "worlds" practically do not intersect.

- How do you explain the attitude of Belarusians to Russian mobilization and to those who seek to avoid it?

- We can clearly say that the Belarusian society is divided.

A significant part of Belarusians supports what Russia is doing in the war, in particular, supports Russian mobilization.

On the other hand, there is also a large part of Belarusian society that supports those Russians who evade mobilization in various ways.

Grigor Astapenia

And in the answers to this question we see two countries, two Belaruss.

This division is visible both in media consumption and in the attitude towards the existing regime in Belarus.

This division did not arise yesterday and will not disappear tomorrow.

— In your previous studies, about 30% supported the position of the Russian Federation on the question of the assessment of Russia's actions in Ukraine.

And now more than 40% approved the mobilization in Russia.

Why did this change happen?

Is the reason still in different issues?

- Actually, these changes are not so significant, especially considering the peculiarities of polling in modern Belarusian conditions.

But we can definitely say that Russia's support in the war has not decreased.

But it is noticeably lower than 50%.

- In the last survey, you also asked respondents questions about mobilization in Belarus.

You offered a set of theses, and warned that some of them are fake.

What answers did the respondents give - what do Belarusians know and what myths do they believe in?

- Belarusians certainly know about the mobilization in Russia.

People know that there is planned conscription into the Belarusian army.

People know less about the rest.

For example, 63% know that a joint regional grouping of the forces of Belarus and Russia has been created.

Relatively few people know that Russian soldiers undergo training in Belarus and are then sent to fight in Ukraine.

People know the most important things.

Some things remain unknown to them.

Few people know about "hidden mobilization" (although the question is whether it is happening).

My colleague Filip Bikanov conducted a study in which he asked Belarusians whose version of the events in Buchi they trust - Ukrainian or Russian.

And he found out that, firstly, Belarusians don't know much about it, and secondly, they don't trust anyone.

A significant part of Belarusians may simply not know about what the media do not talk about day and night.

- Data on the attitude to mobilization in Russia - can these results somehow be extrapolated to the reaction to mobilization in Belarus, if it happens?

- We must be aware that the entry of the Belarusian army into the war will most likely be preceded by some kind of provocation.

And this entry into the war will be presented as a response to aggression.

And we must soberly understand that a significant part of Belarusians will support such a decision.

- In your survey, you asked the question - what kind of telegram would you write to the citizens of Russia and the citizens of Ukraine?

Previously, Russian and Ukrainian sociologists used this technique and this question in parallel studies.

So you talked about the division of Belarusians according to their attitude towards the sides of this war.

But it is interesting that in this "telegram" question there were almost no harsh, condemning answers - very few blamed the Russians for the war, very few shamed the Ukrainians.

The predominant emotion is a wish for peace and compassion.

Why?

- I think that it is largely connected with our national character.

We are not a warlike nation.

Most of these messages are really wishes for peace, a call to "hold on", sympathy.

Called to speak out against his authority, there was very little to think about.

When Belarusians depart from political assessments, they perceive the war as a humanitarian catastrophe.

And part of them supporting the war is actually supporting the government.

If Putin were to say tomorrow that it is necessary to stop fighting, then a good number of Belarusians, who currently support Russia's policy in the war, would agree with this new position of Putin.

I believe that a good number of Russians who now support the war would think the same.

- You have asked the question many times about the geopolitical choice - between union with the Russian Federation and joining the European Union.

As you said, many Belarusians condemn Russia for its aggression against Ukraine.

But it seems that this did not affect the geopolitical choice at all - the numbers from March of this year stand as if buried.

Why?

What does this mean and what does it mean?

Commenting on previous polls, you said that support for Russia is decreasing, "melting".

This graph somehow does not show that it "melted".

- There really was such a trend before, it concerned the assessment of Russia's military actions in Ukraine.

Now there is no such "melting", we see quite stable estimates.

And by forecasting, you can predict that they will not change in the future.

One of the reasons for this is Belarusian media consumption patterns.

Russia plays a huge role in the information space.

And if the situation in the media space does not change, and support for Russia will remain approximately at the current level.

Before discussing the geopolitical reversal of Belarus towards the EU, we must resolve dozens, if not hundreds, of other issues.

How to turn Belarusians away from Russian television is just one of them.

What happened was the reduction of the group that gave "schizophrenic" answers, preferring both the union with the Russian Federation and the accession of Belarus to the EU.

Some of those who chose it realized that it was impossible.

- You have already touched on the topic of media consumption.

According to the results of the survey, a fair number of Belarusians watch both Belarusian and Russian television.

In your previous studies, you talked about "information bubbles", about the fact that consumers of state and non-state, independent media exist, as it were, in worlds that do not intersect.

But the graph shows that a quarter of the respondents consume sources of both varieties.

So are there "bubbles" or not?

- But only a quarter of them.

Still as many consume information mainly from independent media, and a third - from state, Belarusian and Russian media.

So the division is in plain sight.

However, it is interesting how the consumption of those who use sources of both varieties is structured.

A person comes home, turns on the TV, sits on the sofa, turns on the phone and flips through the telegram channels.

And they don't trust any sources too much.

This group is less politicized.

Those who spent a lot of time at the 2020 protests will not watch Solovyov.

Therefore, more politicized people still live in their "bubbles", in their informational "worlds".

At the same time, it should be taken into account that the audience of independent media will simply get into another world, for this they just need to turn on the TV.

At the same time, consumers of state media need to make some effort to enter the world of independents, they need to set up a VPN, they need to search for information, and this search is accompanied by a certain risk.

  • Yuri Drakakhrust

    Journalist of Radio Svaboda


    drakakhrusty@rferl.org

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