Respondents were asked questions related to national identity, political processes in Belarus, attitude to the current war between Russia and Ukraine, geopolitical choices and many others.

The main conclusions of the study are as follows.

  • A significant part of Belarusian society is at the crossroads of identities.

    National projects are strongly connected with socio-political and value conflict in society.

  • Advantages in foreign policy are determined depending on commitment to one or another project of national identity.

    However, support for neutrality prevails among Belarusians.

  • Taking into account the direction of the Belarusian regime and foreign policy dynamics, the split in society will deepen.

In the research, 5 groups of interviewees were identified, which differ significantly from each other according to their attitude to national values.

These are "Conscious" (14%), "Soviet" (29%), "Those who are forming" (39%), "Indifferent" (13%) and "Russified" (4%).

Below are some of the results of the survey with explanations from the author of the report.

The events of 2020 had a significant impact on the perception of the origin of Belarusians: the opinion that Belarusians are a separate nation has become much more popular in two years, while the idea of ​​a trinity of Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians is gradually losing supporters, and there is a break with Soviet and pro-Russian views.

At the moment, the gap is mainly at the expense of the "Obiyaks": they have become much less likely to believe in the trinity and more often - in the existence of a separate Belarusian nation.

The attitude towards the national is indirectly influenced by being in a particular information space.

Segments are radically different in what media they use.

"Aware" is the only segment that is a permanent audience of non-state media.

At the same time, "Soviet", "Indifferent" and "Russified" are most similar in preferences: active consumption of state media prevails here.

The Belarusian audience systematically and regularly receives a predominantly Russian media agenda and a pro-Kremlin view of major world events.

There are two opposite segments in the society, the differences of which lie in the different degree of trust in state and independent structures:

  • Die-hard opponents (21%) – strongly distrust all government structures and strongly trust independent ones;

  • Die-hard supporters (9%) – trust government structures very much and do not trust non-government institutions.

The cores of these two groups are representatives of various national Belarusian projects - "Conscious" and "Soviet", respectively, and thus these groups serve as the basis for social conflict within the country.

They take strictly opposite positions on the issue of the development direction of the Belarusian state, express very strong hostility to each other and use different sources of information.

Representatives of these groups consider the "alternative side" dangerous both for themselves personally and for society as a whole.

These groups are in their respective information bubbles and probably try not to contact each other.

In addition, there are two "centrist" groups - Rather opponents (30%) and Rather supporters (41%), the most mobile in their opinions and assessments of the part of society, they largely consist of "Those who are forming" (in relation to the national ), which determines their "average" level of trust in various structures.

There is a shift towards state paternalism.

At the same time, society as a whole is clearly not ready for manifestations of violence on the part of the state.

Presumably, the population still hasn't forgotten the trauma received in 2020.

Nevertheless, the majority of Belarusians adhere to democratic values ​​and support the control of officials' incomes and the preservation of human dignity.

It can be said that the society continues to adhere to democratic values, however, there is probably disappointment, "forgetting" and rewriting of the events of 2020 in the media.

The most urgent problems are still economic: rising prices, low wages and pensions, which is generally very characteristic of Belarusian society in various dimensions.

Nevertheless, the TOP-5 problems also included political problems, such as Russia's war with Ukraine (87%) and sanctions from the European Union and the United States (concern about which has not changed in general).

In other words, citizens well understand the urgency of the problem of war for Belarus and, presumably, feel its closeness due to the participation of "fraternal" neighboring countries for Belarus and the role of Belarus itself in this conflict.

Compared to the previous survey in 2021, citizens' trust in official government structures has significantly increased.

At the same time, there is also a decrease in trust in those who do not support the official government, in victims in 2020.

The most obvious shift towards "paternalism" is felt among centrists, who do not actively speak unequivocally "for" or "against" the government.

It is probably connected with the war, against the background of which it is easier for conventional "centrists" to explain to themselves the need for representatives of Lukashenka's regime to be in power in Belarus.

The official media promotes a "convenient" position for the centrists regarding the conflict: the country's conditional "neutrality" and non-interference in direct military actions.

Neutrality is the most popular position in international relations, it is supported by half of Belarusians.

Their choice is motivated by pragmatism: they are afraid to join one of the parties to the conflict and want to benefit from cooperation with everyone.

At the same time, supporters of neutrality generally have a European attitude: their choice shifts towards the EU, if it is impossible to go to neutrality.

About a third of Belarusians support the pro-Russian position.

Belarusians are divided on the issue of integration with Russia.

Compared to last year, the share of supporters of integration has increased, and now there are more of them than opponents, although none of the positions is supported by the majority.

By integration with the Russian Federation, Belarusians rarely mean the merger of the main state institutions.

Both supporters and opponents of integration more often believe that it should mean cooperation in the scientific and technical sphere and the creation of a common visa space.

Geopolitical priorities are revealed in the answers to the question of supporting one of the sides in the Russian-Ukrainian war: 41% refuse to take any side, 39% support Russia and 20% support Ukraine.

The pro-Russian position is taken by the majority of supporters of the current government in Belarus (77%) and the audience of state media (60%).

Among the opponents of the government, Ukraine is supported by 66%, and among the audience of non-state media - 44%.

In a word, segments with pro-Russian potential are consolidated in support of Russia, while potentially pro-Ukrainian segments are more often neutral.

  • Yuri Drakakhrust

    Radio Svaboda journalist