Traps of the Association for the functionality of the state of Kosovo

Kosovo's difficult position regarding the association agreement Kosovo is not at all in an easy position regarding the association agreement of 2013 which was signed and approved by the Assembly of Kosovo. There is a consensus within the Kosovar political establishment as well as a part of civil society, analysts and experts...

The difficult position of Kosovo regarding the association agreement

Kosovo is not at all in an easy position regarding the association agreement of 2013 which it signed and approved in the Assembly of Kosovo.

There is an agreement within the Kosovar political establishment as well as a part of the civil society, analysts and experts that the association agreement should begin to be implemented.

This is easily said without analyzing the consequences that an association with non-executive powers may have for Kosovo.

Normally, at first sight this position seems principled because when insisting on this path, it is taken into account that Kosovo has already received these obligations, through the agreements of 2013 and 2015. And, in the end, regardless of what the exponents have claimed of the current government when they were in opposition that the Constitutional Court in 2015 buried the association,

Of course, everyone insists that the implementation of the association should be based on the Constitution of Kosovo, implying that it will not be harmful if it is.

On the other hand, it is sometimes implied that the expression of the will to implement the association should also be used as a card of our diplomacy with which we would put Serbia in a difficult negotiating position.

But in fact, everyone is aware that even in the most optimistic version, the implementation of the association is a Sisyphean task and that even the previous governments, since Mustafa, have tried to draw up the association's statute, but this process has been boycotted by the Serbian political representatives in Kosovo.

Being a project that is difficult to implement and with great consequences for the functionality of the state of Kosovo,

Unfortunately for the fate of the country, this project was demonized in the public opinion, not giving the citizen the opportunity for a normal and civilized debate about it, and consequently, it was rejected by most of the political scene.

Therefore, today everyone is justified, and it seems at first sight that they are right that Kosovo does not have many roads, given that the pressure for the implementation of the association will weigh heavily on Kosovo.

In fact, Kosovo will really be under pressure in this regard, because apart from the dry slogans that 'our platform is the constitution', said over and over again by governments and oppositions for 11 years, it is not that they have revealed any options. other on the table.

Is liberal discourse a solution?

There is also an approach that is not dominant in our political discourse, which we could call a liberal discourse, which is based on non-ethnic but civic solutions.

This would mean that we have problems with the Serbs of Kosovo, that Serbia knows us (or does not exist at all) and in that relation the problem must be solved.

Apart from the fact that the Constitution of Kosovo in its character recognizes ethnic identities and empowers them (especially the Serbian one), Kosovo basically has not finished the problem and the conflict with Serbia, which continues not to recognize Kosovo and to throw stones at it of the consolidation of its citizenship.

Despite our efforts, the Serbs in Kosovo, in these circumstances, are unlikely to break away from Belgrade's influence, especially not the Serbs in the north of the country who also have ethnic homogeneity in a territory that also has territorial continuity with Serbia.

Furthermore, we cannot be selfish and only deal with Kosovo, but we have an obligation to help the Albanians in Eastern Kosovo as well.

Therefore, in this context, the Kosovo-Serbia problem is an Albanian-Serbian problem.

We cannot deal with the problem with the Serbs in Kosovo without the influence of Serbia.

And it is also unfair that we deal with the Serbs in Kosovo and not with the discriminated Albanians in Eastern Kosovo.

The civic and liberal concept takes on its full meaning after solving the problems between Kosovo and Serbia.

As long as this problem remains open, ethnic tensions will remain high and I see no possibility that such solutions will be implemented in Kosovo, much less in Serbia.

Traps of Association

The association project comes with many pitfalls, be it the variant that can be drafted and implemented in accordance with the constitution (which itself, due to the privileges towards the Serbian community, gives Serbia a hand in Kosovo and gives it the opportunity to destabilize and defunctionalize Kosovo) , be it with executive powers.

Also, this project poses a series of questions that we should ask ourselves, but also to our international partners.

Does Serbia recognize us with the 2013/2015 association?

Are relations normalized with this association, and what does 'normalization of relations' mean?

Why should Serbia recognize us for a victory it achieved in 2013?

So far, from foreign diplomats, there is no clear answer to these questions.

It is mentioned that Kosovo has an obligation to implement this agreement, but what is implied is that the talks must continue until the final agreement.

But talks about what?

Endless technical and semi-political talks that would keep us in the

status quo

, in continuous tensions in the process of implementation of the association and in further damage to the functionality due to the association which would not be the end of Serbia's demands?

What do we gain: visa liberalization, the Council of Europe, UNESCO, Interpol?

Are these enough, for our functionality, or one more carrot to push the country from one crisis to another?

Will the Serbian demand for the autonomy of the north come after the association and the insistence of our partners (who have often mentioned it) for a status of the north like that of South Tyrol, or the German Community in Belgium (which is not only cultural and linguistic but also political)?

Will Serbia recognize Kosovo after such solutions?

To be honest, I do not believe that Serbia will ever recognize the independence of Kosovo, but with this format of talks and in this time and geopolitical context (with a Russia busy in the war in Ukraine with all the consequences of this war and the Serbian position in relation to it) will buy time, to be constructive and to move ahead in European integrations.

This path with these projects, including the association with non-executive powers and not recognized by Serbia, being not at all a populist solution, I do not believe that it is accepted by Prime Minister Kurti.

He has risen in politics on the rejection of all options, using on his way to power not only the rejection of these options, but also non-constitutionalist populist methods to win the sympathy of the citizens,

Thus, although he recently seems open to implementing some technical agreements with Serbia, he is basically buying time and sympathy in the international arena to say a big No to any agreement that is not populist.

And, there is no populist agreement with Serbia in any version.

There may be agreements that make Kosovo even more non-functional or such that make it functional.

So such developments could potentially pave the way for political destabilization again, destabilization which could put us back on the road to frequent elections, governments weak in numbers and with problematic political legitimacy to carry out any major deal.

Therefore, a possible option and unfortunately desired by the majority of the political scene is the continuation of this

status-quo

in which they are specialists in political survival and mastery of the political scene.

Once again on the association with non-executive powers

Arguments that the association, which does not have executive powers and is in accordance with the constitution, is not harmful, is naive to say the least.

Any gathering of Serbian municipalities under one umbrella, with an assembly and a mayor, and the exercise by them of the many responsibilities they have as municipalities, would mean an expansion of their own legal responsibilities and especially an expansion of the political action of this mechanism as a representative of Serbs in Kosovo, respectively in the circumstances we are in, of Serbia in Kosovo.

Such a mechanism would begin to take on a life of its own, outside of its legal and constitutional powers.

No international guarantee can stop either the attempt for autonomous territorial action of this mechanism, nor can it stop the ongoing political and legal conflict between the institutions of Kosovo and this mechanism on an ongoing basis.

This could turn into an endless political and legal battle.

International intervention can mitigate the conflict so that it does not endanger Kosovo's security and regional security, but it cannot resolve it as long as this constitutional framework exists.

Even with this solution, Serbia can officially intervene as a "constructive party", as it does from time to time in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Association in any variant is only a prolongation of the final solution between Kosovo and Serbia and will pave the way for a new form of

status-quos

in Kosovo, which will produce the same political crises that we have, the same political logic in governance, the same populism, the same lack of economic, educational and developmental perspectives.

Continued damage to the country's image and continued lack of foreign investment may be accompanying problems of such a situation.

What should be the purpose of the talks?

In this vicious circle of debates that we have had as a society continuously for years about the talks, it is said and argued that the goal of these talks should be mutual recognition, this is a euphemism for the recognition of Kosovo by Serbia and that would follow from Kosovo's membership in international organizations such as the UN, the recognition by the five EU member states that would open the doors for an institutional relationship with the EU and opportunities for membership in NATO, etc.

If what was said above, which as goals are important, are the only goals,

do we risk that by accepting all possible compromises in the name of acceptance by Serbia and in international organizations, we undermine the sovereignty and internal functionality so much that the meaning of independence is lost?

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state recognized by Serbia and also a member of the UN, but what is its functionality?

Let's not talk about other states, members of the UN, but which are treated like it

fragile

(in the past as

failed

) such as Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, etc.

Do we want a state in which Serbia's intervention will be continuous, only now through additional constitutional and legal mechanisms of Kosovo?

Even the Ahtisaari Package itself, which was a big compromise in the name of independence, but also recognition from Serbia and which brought independence but without the recognition of Serbia and which has been incorporated into the constitutional and legal system of Kosovo, has also laid the foundations of the dysfunctionality of our institutions.

Now I would add to this the association, either without or with executive powers!

I was also adding some models of autonomy for the north!

What would be the meaning of membership in the UN or recognition by Serbia?

Such solutions would tire us a lot and turn us into a country with constant political tensions and a lack of optimism for the future.

According to my conviction, the main goal of the talks should be to increase the functionality of the state of Kosovo throughout its territory and security for our republic and its citizens.

Recognition either by Serbia or by the five EU member states, admission to the UN, etc., should be the product of such an agreement, not its goals.

The way forward

There is no doubt that Kosovo cannot continue to reject options and not offer any of its projects, because then we will really be under pressure to implement the signed agreements as well as those that may come as part of international pressures.

Our government and the political parties in position and opposition must release their concrete positions and, realizing the importance of the situation, act with courage, determination, creativity and political offensive.

We do not need manipulative politicians who win elections with populist agendas, but statesmen who solve the problems with Serbia for us and future generations.

The situation in the north of the country is not a problem of organized crime, nor of a certain group of Serbs manipulated by Belgrade.

Both of these are symptoms of the fundamental problem, that in the north of Kosovo, the legitimacy of the state of Kosovo is disputed by the Serbian population, turning this into a deep political problem.

As in any hotbed of political crisis, organized crime finds the opportunity to operate due to the general circumstances, naturally often coexisting and collaborating with politics.

But the deep political problems cannot be solved either with the police or the army, and especially not in these internal and international circumstances in which Kosovo is.

In these circumstances, the North has only political solutions.

Those who think that Kosovo can establish its legitimacy in that part by force are naive.

There is no state that does it without the consent of the local population.

What can produce such a situation is continuous instability, tensions with the risk of riots as we have seen recently, exploited depending on the circumstances sometimes by Serbia, sometimes by Russia and sometimes by both.

The first is intended to prove that the independence of Kosovo is a failed project, the second is intended to create political instability in the geopolitical regions that are under the influence of the North Atlantic Alliance.

However, I am one of those who think that there can be no classic war in these circumstances, nor any open attack by Serbia.

This would be suicide for Serbia and it does not make this mistake.

Here is KFOR, namely NATO and the USA which protect not only Kosovo but also its own geopolitical and geostrategic interests.

I'm talking about the north of Kosovo, while the rest of Kosovo is also about us, the institutions of Kosovo, our people and the willingness to defend the hard-earned freedom.

But what should be the way forward?

There is no doubt that we do not have an easy way forward, but we have never been in a better position as Kosovo and as Albanians to insist on solving the problems with Serbia.

First, we need to change the approach of the talks: not technical talks, nor partial political talks, but political talks about the essence of the problems that would lead to the final agreement.

On what principle should these talks take place?

On political reciprocity as the center of talks: what is required for the north of Kosovo, should also apply to Eastern Kosovo.

And this principle should be used to overcome the pressure for the association.

Association for Serbs in Kosovo, association for Albanians in Eastern Kosovo.

Autonomy for the north, autonomy for Eastern Kosovo.

In fact, this could also apply to the variant of the civic solution: a completely civic state in Kosovo, a civic state in Serbia.

In this direction, political reciprocity regarding all options is not only the right principle but also the only right one, which puts the parties in equal positions.

But what should be the final solution?

Redefining the borders between Kosovo and Serbia as the only solution that makes Kosovo functional.

Such a solution, not prohibiting the creation of the association, but creates the possibility for constitutional changes to remove the blocking privileges for Serbs and keep only the rights for minorities, and which would fully functionalize Kosovo.

Likewise, with this solution, East Kosovo would join Kosovo, fulfilling a national obligation,

state and all of us also human that we have towards that part of the nation.

At the very end, this solution also opens up the possibility to discuss and design the unification process between Kosovo and Albania, if there is popular and political will for this.

I am not naive to think that this solution is easy.

It is very difficult, but I see no other way.

Realizing that the mention of borders can once seem traumatic, the right way is for us to immediately start putting Eastern Kosovo on the negotiation table and solving the problems there through the implementation of reciprocity with the north of Kosovo.